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ABSTRACT 
In October 2015, Chris Baldwin was caught on camera after 
an improbable play had Michigan State University defeating 
University of Michigan in the final seconds of the rivalry football 
game. Overnight, Baldwin’s reaction was an internet sensation, and 
his face was integrated into the word “OHIO” printed on a t-shirt 
supporting University of Michigan’s rivalry with The Ohio State 
University. Uncertainty in the “patchwork” of state right of publicity 
laws makes it unclear whether Baldwin would have had a successful 
claim to protect his image from being used for profit without his 
consent—especially when some jurisdictions find the state right of 
publicity preempted by federal copyright law. The copyrights in this 
case were owned by both ESPN and University of Michigan, which 
both could have instituted a copyright infringement claim against the 
t-shirt company for the unauthorized use of an image from the 
copyrighted broadcasts. 
In today’s technological age, anyone could be caught on 
camera and face the same situation as Chris Baldwin. The person 
who faces this should have a cause of action that is not preempted by 
federal law and is uniform regardless of where the event occurs—
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meaning there needs to be a federal right of publicity statute that can 
coexist with federal copyright law. In addition to the federal right of 
publicity and copyright regime, each ticketed event should sell 
tickets that include express language that the sponsor of the event 
can use the ticket holder’s image and likeness without restriction 
when it is captured by the sponsor’s photographers and 
videographers. While alleged infringers can rely on First 
Amendment defenses, such as transformativeness for the right of 
publicity claim and fair use for the copyright infringement claim, this 
scheme of dual federal rights and a contractual obligation will 
protect all parties involved and still allow the dissemination of 
information under the First Amendment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 17, 2015, the Michigan State University football 
team traveled to Ann Arbor for the 108th battle for the Paul Bunyan 
trophy, the mascot of the annual Michigan State versus University of 
Michigan football game.1 With ten seconds left in the game, 
University of Michigan was ahead 23 – 212 and was set to punt the 
                                                 
 1. No. 7 Spartans, No. 12 Wolverines Battle for the Paul Bunyan Trophy 
in Big East Division Showdown, MSU SPARTANS (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.msuspartans.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/101515aab.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8V4X-7U2A]. See also CFB Fans, Michigan State vs Michigan Full Game 
17/10/2015 NCAA Football Week 7, YOUTUBE (Oct. 18, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fa60YNgAG-Q [https://perma.cc/ 
AY4P-Y6TQ] (showing the entire football game).  
 2. Dan Murphy, Michigan State Stuns Michigan with Final-Play Fumble 
Return, ESPN (Oct. 18, 2015), http://www.espn.com/college-football/ 
recap?gameId=400763542 [https://perma.cc/P3UM-J8J6].  
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ball away on fourth down on its own forty yard line.3 Dejected, with 
only a 0.2% chance to win,4 Michigan State resigned itself to the loss 
and delivered the Paul Bunyan trophy to the Wolverines.5 But 
University of Michigan punter Blake O’Neill bobbled the snap, and 
his off balance kick landed the ball straight into the hands of 
Michigan State’s Jalen Watts-Jackson.6 Watts-Jackson ran the ball 
thirty-eight yards into the end zone for an improbable, and almost 
impossible, game-winning play.7 After the touchdown, in the stunned 
silence of the stadium, television cameras rested on the face of 
stricken University of Michigan fan Chris Baldwin, who stood with 
his hands pressed to his head and mouth draped open in shocked 
disbelief.8 
Within hours, Baldwin’s face was splashed across the Internet, 
making him an instant overnight celebrity, an icon in the college 
football world9—dubbing him the “Sad Michigan Fan.”10 Cincy 
Shirts, an Ohio-based T-shirt company that supported University of 
Michigan’s archrival Ohio State University, saw an opportunity.11 It 
seized the frozen image of Baldwin in the now nicknamed “surrender 
                                                 
 3. See CFB Fans, supra note 1. The specific play referenced can be found 
beginning at time 2:41:40. Id.  
 4. Kevin Trahan, Michigan State Was So Sure It Had Lost to Michigan, It 
Had Already Given Away the Trophy, SB NATION (Oct. 18, 2015, 8:39 AM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2015/10/17/9562197/michigan-state-
michigan-paul-bunyan-trophy [https://perma.cc/JN86-ATEB]. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Murphy, supra note 2. 
 7. See id.; see also Michigan v. Michigan State - Play-by-Play, ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/college-football/playbyplay?gameId=400763542 
[https://perma.cc/M8K4-WKLB] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017); CFB Fans, supra note 1 
(showing the specific bobbled punt returned for a touchdown at 2:41:48).  
 8. See CFB Fans, supra note 1. The specific reaction referenced can be 
found beginning at time 2:41:59. Id. 
 9. See Shocked in the Stands: U of M Fan Identified, FOX 17 NEWS (Oct. 
19, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://fox17online.com/2015/10/19/shocked-in-the-stands-u-of-
m-fan-identified/ [https://perma.cc/QB5Z-TS9N].  
 10. See Michigan State and Ohio State Fans Get Creative, Immortalize 
“Sad Michigan Fan” in Merch, HERO SPORTS (Oct. 27, 2015, 3:30 AM), 
http://herosports.com/collegefootball/michigan-state-ohio-state-fans-sad-michigan-
fan-shirt-pumpkin [https://perma.cc/R6AS-AJMN] (describing Baldwin’s image as 
the “Sad Michigan Fan”). 
 11. See Ben Goldschmidt, Did Michigan Fan Ever Get Any Money from 
Cincy Shirts?, CINCINNATI.COM (Jan. 5, 2016, 3:14 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/ 
story/entertainment/2016/01/05/did-michigan-fan-ever-get-money-cincy-shirts/ 
78135800/ [https://perma.cc/U5JB-RUHC]. 
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cobra” pose12 and made Baldwin’s round face the first “O” in 
“OHIO” on T-shirts for sale.13 However, Cincy Shirts did not obtain 
Baldwin’s consent prior to using his image on its T-shirts, and the 
shirts turned a handsome profit.14 After Baldwin announced in media 
interviews that the company was profiting off his image and not 
paying him, the T-shirt company paid him an undisclosed amount of 
money.15 
 
16 
17 
                                                 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Luke Kerr-Dineen, Ohio State T-shirt Mocks Michigan Fans After 
Devastating Loss, USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 2015, 8:21 AM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/ 
2015/10/ohio-state-T-shirt-mocks-michigan-fans-after-devastating-loss [https:// 
perma.cc/MP8A-ZCE5].  
 14. See Goldschmidt, supra note 11. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Mark Tower, Meme-Spawning Michigan Fan Presents ESPN ‘Best 
Play’ Award to MSU, MLIVE (Dec. 14, 2015, 10:22 AM), http://www.mlive.com/ 
news/saginaw/index.ssf/2015/12/stunned_michigan_fan_presents.html [https:// 
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Baldwin’s case is not new—there have been numerous cases 
that result from a company using the likeness of a celebrity without 
his or her consent.18 One of the most famous is White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, Inc., where the defendant used a robot in a 
mock Wheel of Fortune set to portray Vanna White in a commercial, 
and the court held that the defendant misappropriated Ms. White’s 
identity.19 Throughout the last half century, the right of publicity, a 
new legal doctrine arising out of a mixture of state statutes and 
common law, was developed to allow people to protect their name 
and likeness from being used without their consent.20 However, in the 
case of Chris Baldwin, an unknown college student attending a 
football game, the issue of whether he has a right to protect his name 
and likeness from being exploited commercially is not as clear cut as 
a celebrity protecting his or her image.21 
Not only is there an issue of Baldwin enforcing his right of 
publicity, but it is unclear whether that right could be preempted by a 
copyright claim of the broadcaster that first fixed Baldwin’s pose in a 
tangible medium.22 Where the right of publicity laws and copyright 
laws protect “equivalent rights,” the right of publicity is preempted.23 
In Baldwin’s case, ESPN, the sports broadcaster, and the University 
of Michigan would own the copyright of Baldwin’s image for that 
particular clip of game footage.24 If the right of publicity claim is 
                                                                                                       
perma.cc/7HSB-T2XJ]. 
 17. See Goldschmidt, supra note 11. 
 18. See, e.g., Michael J. Hoisington, Celebrities Sue over Unauthorized Use 
of Identity, HIGGS, FLETCHER, & MACK LLP, http://higgslaw.com/celebrities-sue-
over-unauthorized-use-of-identity/ [https://perma.cc/GK3K-8T2X] (last visited Nov. 
6, 2017). 
 19. No. 90-55840, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253, at *2-3, *13 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 19, 1992). 
 20. See Jeremy T. Marr, Note, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of 
Publicity Laws, 44 B.C. L. REV. 863, 863 (2003). 
 21. See Charlsie Dewey, Copyright Infringement Cases Take a Personal 
Turn, GRAND RAPIDS BUS. J. (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.grbj.com/articles/83887-
copyright-infringement-cases-take-a-personal-turn [https://perma.cc/6ETU-PTAZ]. 
In Michigan, cases have come out both ways on whether or not one has to be famous 
to have a right of publicity claim. Id. Some cases suggest that having some level of 
celebrity status is important, but other cases indicate that is not necessary. Id. 
 22. See id.; see also Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 675 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing preemption of a right of 
publicity claim by professional baseball players). 
 23. Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675. 
 24. See Dewey, supra note 21 (discussing the second legal issue of 
copyright infringement to using Chris Baldwin’s image); see also Kyle Austin, 
 The “Sad Michigan Fan” 871 
preempted by the copyright owner’s claim, Chris Baldwin and any 
other fan that may be caught on camera are left with few to no rights 
to protect their names and likenesses from being commercially 
exploited.25 
The rights of the average fan caught on video whose likeness 
may be commercially exploited must be explored and solidified.26 
Due to technology, anyone’s image may become an Internet 
sensation, and companies can use that image to make a profit without 
obtaining consent from that person.27 There should be a uniform 
federal right of publicity statute28 that can apply to any person, which 
would establish a cause of action for both the person, through a right 
of publicity claim, and the owner of the copyright, through a 
copyright infringement claim.29 In conjunction with this statute, 
every major event with masses of people that requires tickets for 
entry should have tickets that contain terms and conditions that allow 
the organization behind the event to utilize the person’s image freely, 
so there would not be an unnecessary amount of litigation against the 
owner of the copyright.30 However, the right of publicity statute and 
                                                                                                       
Michigan vs. Michigan State 2015: What Channel, Live Stream, How to Watch 
Online, MLIVE (Oct. 17, 2015 2:55PM), http://www.mlive.com/sports/2015/10/ 
michigan_vs_michigan_state_201.html [https://perma.cc/DJ49-Q5H2]. 
 25. See Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679. 
 26. See Dewey, supra note 21. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of 
Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 249 (2002) (explaining how some scholars 
recommend a federal right of publicity to balance federal and state interests while 
allowing for uniform protection of performers). 
 29. See Marr, supra note 20, at 869; see also Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul 
Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, 28 COMM. LAW. 14, 
14-15 (2011). The closest analogous law to a federal right of publicity law is the 
Lanham Act, which applies to many similar situations, but requires falsity, 
deception, and confusion as to whether the person whose image is being used is 
actually endorsing the defendant’s product. Id. at 15.  
 30. See Michigan State University v. University of Michigan, University of 
Michigan Football Ticket (Oct. 17, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Michigan 
State v. Michigan Football Ticket]. The ticket states: 
The Holder of this ticket grants Michigan and its respective licensees 
and agents an unrestricted right and license to utilize Holder’s image, 
likeness, actions, and statements in any live or recorded audio, video, or 
photographic display or other transmission, broadcast, exhibition or 
reproduction made of, or at the event without further authorization or 
compensation. 
Id. The University of Michigan ticket is the same or substantially the same for each 
ticket during a single season; this specific clause has not changed in recent years. 
Compare Bowling Green v. University of Michigan, University of Michigan Football 
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the copyright infringement claim should still be subject to First 
Amendment defenses, as this ensures that there is protection for the 
person whose image is exploited and the copyright holder while not 
hindering free speech.31  
Part I discusses the history of the right of publicity law from its 
emergence, including an overview of states that have codified the 
right of publicity and the common law rules in states that have not. 
Part II discusses the right of publicity in relation to copyright law, 
discussing the court splits on preemption. Part III discusses a brief 
history of the Lanham Act. Part IV analyzes the problem of using a 
fan’s image for profit and the proposed solution to prevent the many 
lawsuits that could be filed over the same image.  
I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity originally derived from the 
misappropriation prong included in the invasion of privacy tort.32 
However, discrepancy in right of publicity laws remains as it is 
entirely a matter of state law.33 Due to the fact there is no federal 
guidance, states are free to adopt statutes, follow common law, or 
reject the right of publicity entirely.34 However, these rights must all 
be balanced with the First Amendment.35 
                                                                                                       
Ticket (Sept. 25, 2010) (on file with author), with Indiana v. University of Michigan, 
University of Michigan Football Ticket (Nov. 19, 2016) (on file with author).  
 31. See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, 
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 852 (2010) (“The fair 
use doctrine is the second major mechanism internal to the copyright regime which 
is proffered as a supposed cushion against abridgement of First Amendment 
rights.”). 
 32. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 14; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“One who appropriates to his 
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy.”). 
 33. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 14.  
 34. See id. at 15. However, states are not likely to reject the right of 
publicity outright as a result of the Supreme Court of the United States’ recognition 
of Ohio’s right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 572-77 (1977). Id. Thus, because of this recognition by the Supreme Court 
and because there will not be a recovery for the use of one’s image without 
permission without a right of publicity law, the states that do not have a statutory or 
common law right of publicity will not be focused on in this Comment. See id. 
 35. See Reid Kress Weisbord, A Copyright Right of Publicity, 84 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2803, 2812 (2016) (“[P]ublicity rights operate by granting the owner 
exclusionary rights, thus allowing the personality to enjoin or charge for use of her 
persona. Exclusionary rights may be waived or not asserted, so the right of publicity 
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A. The Development of the Right of Publicity 
Rooted in privacy law, the right of publicity claim originally 
recognized that use of a person’s name and likeness without his or 
her consent can cause pain and mental stress.36 Over time this 
changed.37 Key court decisions expanded the right of publicity laws 
to allow a person to recover both noneconomic damages and 
economic damages from lost opportunities to commercially exploit 
one’s own image.38  
The right of publicity is a modern protection that began with 
the invention of photography and printing.39 Prior to these inventions 
and as early as the founding of this country, celebrity status and fame 
were considered common property of the people, despite the 
increasing amount of commercial exploitation of celebrities.40 With 
the invention of photography and printing, pictorial advertisements 
became more common, and those in the advertisements attempted to 
control the commercial use of their likeness.41 In 1890, Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis published an article in which they 
                                                                                                       
operates by allowing the right holder to decide whether to permit the use of her 
persona. The very existence of publicity rights, therefore, tends to chill speech about 
the personality because the right creates at least the threat of possible liability for use 
of the persona.”).  
 36. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 14. The offense was related to the 
misappropriation of the person’s name and likeness as an offense to the person 
rather than an economic injury for lost opportunity of commercial exploitation of 
that name and likeness. Id.  
 37. See id. at 14-15. This has not changed in all courts, though, as some 
courts continue to view the right of publicity as a personal right of privacy rather 
than economic gain. Id. at 14. 
 38. See id. at 14-15. 
 39. See Mark Joseph Stern & Nat Stern, A New Test to Reconcile the Right 
of Publicity with Core First Amendment Values, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 93, 95-96 
(2015) (explaining the invention of photography and printing led to the shift from a 
common ownership of fame to an individual ownership).  
 40. See id. (noting that this derived from the celebrity status of a person as a 
“species of common property” rather than personal property); see also NEIL HARRIS, 
CULTURAL EXCURSIONS: MARKETING APPETITES AND CULTURAL TASTES IN MODERN 
AMERICA 239 (1990) (“Yet all this stimulated little litigation. Some unspoken 
assumption made famous people . . . a species of common property whose 
commodity exploitation required little control.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 96 (“As photography and 
printing technology grew more sophisticated, pictorial advertisements exploded, and 
famous people began to attempt to assert commercial control over their likenesses. 
Predictably, most courts rejected these early suits; still, a few prescient courts 
recognized an individual’s proprietary interest in his own identity.”). 
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proposed a right to privacy to protect one’s identity from 
“journalistic intrusiveness,”42 suggesting that a person has a 
proprietary interest in his or her identity.43 The rationale underlying a 
right of publicity was that if court decisions could indicate a general 
right to privacy for emotions, thoughts, and sensations, these should 
receive the same protection whether expressed in writing, conduct, or 
facial expression.44 For Warren and Brandeis, “the right of privacy 
was the vehicle for the protection of an internal interest, the feelings 
of one who involuntarily had been publicly used.”45 
The early application in legislature and court decisions of the 
right to privacy required that plaintiffs allege embarrassment or 
emotional distress.46 However, the legal landscape for right to 
privacy and right of publicity changed with Haelan Laboratory, Inc. 
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.47 Here, the Second Circuit held that the 
                                                 
 42. See id.; accord Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 206 (1890) (“The circumstance that a thought or 
emotion has been recorded in a permanent form renders its identification 
easier[.] . . . If, then, the decisions indicate a general right to privacy for thoughts, 
emotions, and sensations, these should receive the same protection, whether 
expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial 
expression.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Yvette Joy Liebesman, When Selling Your Personal Name 
Mark Extends to Selling Your Soul, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2010) (“Warren and 
Brandeis argued that it was necessary and desirable that our courts recognize and 
protect, at least to some extent, the right to privacy. After discussing several theories 
under which courts had granted relief for a wrongful publication, the authors 
concluded that there was, in case law, ‘a principle which may be invoked to protect 
the privacy of the individual.’ This common law right to privacy was predicated 
upon the interest of an individual in the exclusive nature of his personality. Whether 
phrased in terms of the right ‘to be let alone’ or freedom from exposure, the right of 
privacy was the vehicle for the protection of an internal interest, the feelings of one 
who involuntarily has been publicly ‘used.’”). 
 44. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 45. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation 
of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (1986) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 46. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 97. This theory of the right of 
publicity resulted from the right of privacy that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
proposed in their 1890 article, leading to the direct link between the right of privacy 
and the right of publicity. Id. at 96. 
 47. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). In Haelan, the Court was confronted with 
a situation in which a baseball player had contracted with a single chewing gum 
company for exclusive rights to the ballplayer’s photograph. Id. at 867. A rival 
chewing-gum company then deliberately induced the player to allow the company to 
use his photograph. Id. The Court recognized the player’s right of publicity 
explaining that a prominent person would be deprived of the monetary benefit of his 
or her image if he or she was no longer receiving money from the use of their 
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right of publicity was in addition to and independent of the right to 
privacy.48 The following year, Melville Nimmer released an article in 
response to Warren and Brandeis’s article, further developing the 
idea that the right to privacy is an inadequate means for allowing 
persons to control the use of their likeness without outright 
prohibiting its use.49 In 1960, William Prosser became the Chief 
Reporter of the Second Restatement of Torts and codified 
misappropriation.50 The same year, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the general principle of publicity rights passed First 
Amendment scrutiny.51 
The right of publicity, beginning with the Haelan decision, was 
used to protect celebrities.52 To date, the most well-known cases for 
right of publicity laws are derived from the use of celebrity 
likeness.53 The most recognizable case in the last twenty-five years is 
White v. Samsung Electronics, where the defendant aired a 
commercial that used a robot in front of a Wheel of Fortune board 
dressed similarly to Vanna White.54 The Ninth Circuit explained that 
                                                                                                       
likeness in advertising. Id. at 868. See also Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 98 
(discussing the Haelan decision).  
 48. Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868. Haelan argued that the right of 
publicity was a separate right that was based in property and thus could be 
transferred, which differentiated it from the right of privacy. Id. at 867. 
 49. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 99; Melville B. Nimmer, The Right 
of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1953). 
 50. See supra notes 32 and 39 and accompanying text.  
 51. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) 
(holding that one trying to protect his or her right of publicity does not seek to enjoin 
the broadcast of the performance, but merely wants to be paid for it, which passes 
First Amendment scrutiny); see also Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 100. 
 52. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 99; Kelli L. Sager, Summary of 
Right of Publicity Issues, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 1 (Sept. 2012), 
https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.ku.edu/files/docs/media_law/Summary_of_Right_of_Pu
blicity_Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9BK-SP7C] (discussing right of publicity laws 
in terms of celebrities and their personas).  
 53. See generally White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 90-55840, 1992 
U.S. App. LEXIS 19253, at *13 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992) (finding that defendants 
using Vanna White’s identity violated her common law right of publicity); Midler v. 
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a singer’s right of 
publicity was violated when the defendant used a sound-alike because it was an 
appropriation of the singer’s identity); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, 
Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1983) (defining right 
of publicity as a celebrity’s exclusive right to his or her name and likeness); Estate 
of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981) (defining the right of 
publicity as the right of an individual, especially a celebrity, to control the 
commercial value of his or her image and likeness). 
 54. White, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253, at *1-3. 
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a celebrity identity has marketable value and celebrities should be 
able to decide when and how to exploit that value under California 
law.55 As judicial acceptance of the right of publicity grew, 
uncertainty remained as to what the limits of the rights were.56 The 
right of publicity is analogous to state law protections for 
misappropriation, and policy considerations are equivalent to those 
that underlie federal copyright law.57 As of 2014, forty-one states 
recognize a statutory or common law right of publicity protection.58 
                                                 
 55. Id. at *12-13 (“Television and other media create marketable celebrity 
identity value. Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have 
achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit. The law protects the celebrity’s sole 
right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare 
ability, dumb luck, or a combination thereof.”). This case involving Vanna White 
has been cited by numerous articles in the past several years. See Katherine Boyle, 
Vanna White: Let the Great Wheel Spin, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/tv/vanna-white-let-the-great-wheel-
spin/2013/09/11/f89dbabc-198a-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0_story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/RY64-5N58] (discussing who Vanna White is in relation to the show 
Wheel of Fortune and her lawsuit against Samsung as an example of how she takes 
her image seriously); Sunny Hostin, The Naked Truth About the Naked Cowboy 
Case, CNN (Apr. 11, 2008, 4:13 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/02/14/ 
naked.cowboy/ [https://perma.cc/Y57M-TH97] (using White as an example of a 
time when a celebrity sued to enforce her right to publicity); Matt Novak, Robot 
Vanna, Trashy Presidents and Steak as Health Food: Samsung Sells Tomorrow, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/robot-
vanna-trashy-presidents-and-steak-as-health-food-samsung-sells-tomorrow-
22348926/ [https://perma.cc/V2YQ-V8KU] (using Samsung’s advertisement 
featuring the Vanna White robot at the center of the White case to show how 
advertisers use futurism to sell their products). 
 56. See, e.g., David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: 
The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 675 
(1981). (“Despite such judicial recognition, the definition of the right of publicity 
remains unclear; its theory is still evolving and its limits are uncertain.”). 
 57. See id. (explaining the right of publicity is analogous to 
misappropriation in rationale, purpose, and scope, and the interests of right of 
publicity laws parallel those of copyright law). 
 58. See William K. Smith, Comment, Saving Face: Adopting a Right of 
Publicity to Protect North Carolinians in an Increasingly Digital World, 92 N.C. L. 
REV. 2065, 2116 (2014). Table 1 discusses whether each state has common law right 
of publicity protection, statutory right or publicity protection, whether the right 
continues postmortem, and what the nature of the right is. Id. at 2108-16. 
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B. State Right of Publicity Protections Range from Statutes, to 
Common Law, to Nothing 
Despite the developments in the last half century, the right of 
publicity is established only through state laws.59 A vast majority of 
states recognize the right of publicity through statutes or common 
law; however, the elements that encompass the right vary from state 
to state.60 The differences in state laws have created a “quilt” of 
divergent rights of publicity throughout the country.61   
1. Twenty-Two States Have Codified the Right of Publicity into 
a Statute62  
New York has one of the most limited right of publicity 
statutes within its privacy laws.63 This statutory right protects any 
living person from having his or her name, portrait, or picture used in 
advertising without the person’s consent.64 The New York statute 
specifies a protection for unauthorized use for advertising purposes 
only, but also allows the protection to be for any person, celebrity or 
not.65 New York has also codified the right of a person whose image 
or likeness was used for advertising without consent to recover 
punitive damages for intentional violations.66 New York limits its 
                                                 
 59. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (explaining that right of 
publicity laws are left for the states to develop). 
 60. See Sager, supra note 52, at 1 (noting the most common elements in a 
right of publicity include: (1) the use of someone’s name, identity, likeness, or 
persona; (2) the defendant receives a commercial advantage from the use; (3) the use 
was made without consent; and (4) the plaintiff is injured). 
 61. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (“It is difficult to group the [state 
right of publicity] statutes into any sort of coherent ‘types’ or subspecies. . . . Each 
statute is really ‘one of a kind’ in that it is largely a product of its time and place.”) 
(alterations in original). 
 62. See Smith, supra note 58, at 2116. 
 63. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1909); see also Vick & 
Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (discussing the limitations of the New York right of 
privacy statute). 
 64. See CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50. 
 65. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1984) (including protection 
from use “on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or 
selling, or soliciting purchases”), with CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50. 
 66. See CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51; Sager, supra note 52, at 1 n.4 (“Punitive 
damages are available for ‘knowing’ violations.”). 
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protection of a right of publicity to commercial purposes and does 
not allow for the protection of postmortem rights.67 
The New York statute is extremely limited in what it protects, 
especially compared to Indiana’s statute.68 Indiana has one of the 
most expansive right of publicity laws, which covers a person’s 
personality, defined as including a person’s name, likeness, 
signature, voice, photograph, image, gesture, appearance, or 
mannerism.69 This protection also extends to any event that occurs in 
Indiana and allows for a 100-year postmortem right of publicity.70 
California recognizes both a common law and statutory right of 
publicity.71 The different protections are important because 
California, the home of Hollywood and major motion picture studios, 
and New York are the most common places for celebrities to bring 
right of publicity claims.72 Consequently, California and New York 
are the jurisdictions with the most established right of publicity 
laws.73 The common law right of publicity was established in 
California in 1983 by Eastwood v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County.74 The common law right established three elements, 
including: (1) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness by 
                                                 
 67. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (explaining this right allows the 
heir of the celebrity to bring a lawsuit for infringing the celebrity’s right of publicity 
after the celebrity has died). 
 68. See id. at 16. 
 69. See IND. CODE §§ 32-36-1-6, -7 (2002); see also Vick & Jassy, supra 
note 29, at 15. (“The Indiana right of publicity statute ‘applies to an act or event that 
occurs within Indiana, regardless of a personality’s domicile, residence, or 
citizenship.’”) (citing IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(a) (2012)). The language of the statute 
is broad and “could encompass virtually anything on the Internet and much of what 
is on television and in print.” Id. The primary reason Indiana has such extensive 
right of publicity laws without being media or entertainment focused is due to the 
lobbying for such a law from CMG Worldwide, which is an Indiana based company 
that represents the heirs of many deceased celebrities. Id. at 16. 
 70. See §§ 32-36-1-1(a), -8; see also Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15. 
 71. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 16 (noting California’s right of 
publicity laws were expanded through several Ninth Circuit cases, including one that 
expanded the right to include a racecar driver’s car).  
 72. See Sager, supra note 52, at 1 (explaining that celebrities historically 
have brought most right of publicity claims in California and New York, although 
other jurisdictions are deciding more cases recently). 
 73. See id.  
 74. 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), superseded by statute, 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344, Amended Stats. 1984 ch. 1704 § 2. Eastwood involved a 
situation in which an actor was published in an offending news magazine article. Id. 
at 414. See also Sager, supra note 52, at 1 n.4. 
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defendant; (2) lack of plaintiff’s consent; and (3) injury to plaintiff.75 
California has also codified the right of publicity to protect against a 
person who knowingly uses another’s likeness in any manner.76 This 
statutory right adds two additional elements to the common law 
right, including (4) a knowing use and (5) a direct connection 
between the use and a commercial purpose.77 
Another example of a well-established right of publicity law is 
Illinois, which codified the right in 1998 under the Right of Publicity 
Act.78 This Act allows any person to control the use of his or her 
individual identity for commercial purposes.79 This Act is 
distinguishable from both the California and New York laws in that 
it exempts some commercial purposes, including portraying that 
person’s identity where the work is not considered a commercial 
advertisement, the use of images by a professional photographer, and 
the use of the individual’s name as identifying the person as an 
author or performer.80 The New York, Indiana, Illinois, and 
California statutes exemplify how significantly the right of publicity 
can vary in who is protected, what unauthorized uses are protected 
against, and how long the protection lasts.81 
2. Nineteen States Use a Common Law Right of Publicity82  
Since the right of publicity is exclusively the domain of state 
law, there are numerous states that follow only a common law right 
of publicity.83 The District of Columbia established a common law 
                                                 
 75. See Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417; Sager, supra note 52, at 1 n.4. 
 76. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1984). 
 77. See Sager, supra note 52, at 1 n.4 (explaining the two rights were 
intended to complement each other rather than have one that replaced the other). 
Compare Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417, with CIV. CODE § 3344(a).  
 78. See 1997 ILL. Laws 747.  
 79. See id. § 10 (“Recognition of right of publicity. The right to control and 
to choose whether and how to use an individual’s identity for commercial purposes 
is recognized as each individual’s right of publicity.”). 
 80. See id. § 35 (discussing the applicability of this Act). 
 81. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a); 1997 ILL. LAWS 747; IND. CODE § 32-36-
1-1 (2012); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1909); see also ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-761 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.800 (West 1989); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §2741.04 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1449 (2014); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 8316 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §21-64-10 (2015); TEX. PROP. 
CODE §§ 26.001-.015 (1987).  
 82. See Smith, supra note 58, at 2108-17. 
 83. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15-16. 
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right of publicity through its courts’ adoption of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 625.84 Later decisions have further clarified that 
the right of privacy under the rule of appropriation is not limited to 
commercial purposes, but also includes use of the plaintiff’s name 
and likeness by a third party for the third party’sown purpose and 
benefit.85 Some courts have also held that the plaintiff must allege the 
commercial benefit gained by the defendant was derived from the 
reputation the public associated with the plaintiff.86 
In comparison, Georgia first recognized a common law right of 
publicity in Cabaniss v. Hipsley.87 Not only did the Georgia Court of 
Appeals recognize a right of publicity, but it also recognized four 
related torts, including: (1) intrusion into plaintiff’s private affairs; 
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light; and (4) appropriation of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness from which the defendant benefitted.88 
Through these four torts, the Georgia courts have separated right of 
publicity and misappropriation.89 In deciding a case interpreting 
                                                 
 84. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 
1985) (“The District of Columbia has long recognized the common law tort of 
invasion of privacy. In so doing, the courts have adopted the RESTATEMENT 
formulation.”). Vassiliades involved a claim for invasion of privacy for use of before 
and after images from the plaintiff’s cosmetic surgery in various presentations. Id. at 
580.  
 85. See Tripp v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2003). The 
Tripp case involved information regarding the plaintiff’s criminal history on a 
security clearance application being given to a New Yorker reporter and 
subsequently published in the New Yorker. Id. at 39. Due to the plaintiff’s notoriety 
at the time, the Court found that the plaintiff stated enough to establish a 
misappropriation claim under District of Columbia laws. Id. at 43.  
 86. See id. at 43 (citing Barnako v. Foto Kirsch, Ltd., No. 87-1700, 1987 
WL 10230 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1987)) (discussing the “value” associated with the 
plaintiff’s likeness to establish a cause of action). For example, in Barnako, the 
District Court relied heavily on the fact that no one but the plaintiff would recognize 
that it was the plaintiff in the photograph and held that this failed to show value 
garnered by the defendant’s use. 1987 WL 10230, at *2. Thus, the defendant needed 
to obtain some value through the public’s knowledge of the plaintiff. Id.  
 87. 114 Ga. App. 367, 370 (1966). In Cabaniss, the plaintiff brought claims 
relating to the defendant’s unauthorized use of images of the plaintiff in her exotic 
dancer profession in magazines that were distributed throughout Atlanta. Id. at 368-
69. 
 88. See id. at 370 (“Dean Prosser has analyzed the many privacy cases in an 
article entitled ‘Privacy,’ published in 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 in 1960 . . . We consider 
this analysis well-founded and take it as a starting point for our deliberations here.”). 
 89. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage 
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 680 (11th Cir. 1983) (“‘Recognizing, as we do, the 
fundamental distinction between causes of action involving injury to feelings, 
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Georgia law, the Eleventh Circuit defined a right of publicity as a 
celebrity’s right to control the use of his or her name and likeness.90 
The court went on to hold that there was a tort cause of action for 
misappropriation of one’s name and likeness for private citizens, as 
distinguished from public figures and celebrities.91 
In 1982, the Michigan Supreme Court defined four types of 
common law invasion of privacy, including: (1) intrusion into 
plaintiff’s personal affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing 
facts; (3) publicity which places plaintiff in a false light; and (4) 
appropriation for defendant’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.92 Interpreting Michigan law, the Sixth Circuit, in Carson v. 
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., defined a right of publicity as a 
celebrity’s right to protect his or her identity from commercial 
exploitation.93 More recently, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed and 
expanded the protection of a celebrity’s right of publicity, holding 
that plaintiffs only had to prove they have a pecuniary interest in 
their identity and that the defendant commercially exploited that 
                                                                                                       
sensibilities or reputation and those involving an appropriation of rights in the nature 
of property rights for commercial exploitation.’”) (citing Pavesich v. New England 
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 217-18 (1905)). 
 90. See id. at 676-78 (“[I]t is common knowledge that many prominent 
persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised 
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no 
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their 
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.”). It 
should be noted that this right of publicity specifically pertains to well-known 
persons who could claim an injury for loss of profits for unauthorized uses of his or 
her image. Id. 
 91. See id. at 680 (“We conclude that while private citizens have the right 
of privacy, public figures have a similar right of publicity, and that the measure of 
damages to a public figure for violation of his or her right of publicity is the value of 
the appropriation to the user.”). 
 92. See Tobin v. Mich. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 331 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Mich. 
1982). In Tobin, employees brought a cause of action under Michigan’s Freedom of 
Information Act for public disclosure of personal information. Id. at 185. 
 93. 698 F.2d 831, 835, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[A] celebrity’s legal right of 
publicity is invaded whenever his identity is intentionally appropriated for 
commercial purposes.”). Carson involved a portable toilets company using the host 
of “The Tonight Show” John W. Carson’s catchphrase “Here’s Johnny” to promote 
its product. Id. at 832-33. In Carson, the Court found it was enough that the 
plaintiff’s identity was appropriated, despite not using the plaintiff’s “name.” Id. at 
837. See also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459-60 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(indicating Michigan recognizes a right of publicity). In Parks, the plaintiff sued a 
band for using her name as the title of a song. Id. at 442-43. 
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identity.94 It is unclear, based on these Sixth Circuit decisions, 
whether a private citizen, rather than a celebrity, has a right of 
publicity in Michigan.95 Regardless of the type of right granted, it 
could be limited by other doctrines.96 
C. First Amendment Limitation to Right of Publicity 
There has long been tension between free speech and the 
protection of one’s image and likeness.97 In general, the right of 
publicity does not prohibit the use of someone’s identity for news 
reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, 
or advertising for these works.98 That is, these types of uses are 
protected by the First Amendment.99 
Since the individual may choose when to permit his or her 
likeness to be used, the right of publicity can chill speech.100 Courts 
have attempted to balance the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment, including using various defenses such as adopting the 
copyright fair use “transformative [] test”101 or using the 
                                                 
 94. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 459-60 (indicating Michigan recognizes a right 
of publicity).  
 95. See Dewey, supra, note 21 (indicating that, in Michigan, the general 
rule appears to be that you only have to have a pecuniary interest in your name or 
likeness and do not have to be a celebrity, but decisions have gone both ways).  
 96. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2812-13 (explaining the tension 
between free speech and the right of publicity). 
 97. See id. at 2811 (“On the one hand, the value of publicity rights is almost 
always enhanced by the public’s use of and speech about the persona because the 
commercial value of and demand for a persona is often a direct function of the 
overall volume of speech in the public discourse about the personality.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 28, at 206-07 (explaining the right of 
publicity was expanded to include works of entertainment, including movies, songs, 
and books, but does not extend to one’s identity in advertising for these works of 
entertainment).  
 99. See id. at 207.  
 100. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2812-13 (“The right of publicity 
inhibits the freedom of expression when it prevents or constrains speech concerning 
a person’s identity.”); see also Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First 
Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978) 
(explaining that the “chilling effect doctrine” is often used in free speech 
adjudication where there is a state statute or other rule that “might inhibit the 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms”). 
 101. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2813 (discussing the origin, nature, and 
application of the transformative test in the right of publicity).  
 The “Sad Michigan Fan” 883 
“newsworthiness test.”102 However, in attempting to strike this 
balance, courts have often favored speech over the right of 
publicity.103 This is most likely due to the fact that the freedom of 
speech arises under the First Amendment—constitutional law—
while right of publicity is state law, which is often preempted and 
often ends when another’s free speech begins.104 However, the use of 
balancing tests results in courts, even within the same state, finding 
on both sides.105 A sampling of California cases demonstrates the use 
of multiple tests, resulting in different outcomes in determining First 
Amendment protection.106 
1. “Transformativeness” as a Defense to Right of Publicity 
Violations 
California is an ideal example of courts using the 
“transformative tests” and those courts coming to different decisions 
within the same jurisdiction.107 The transformativeness inquiry 
determines whether the likeness is based on the raw materials that 
contribute to the end product or is essentially the substance of the 
end product itself.108 In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
                                                 
 102. See Mark Bartholomew, Intellectual Property’s Lessons for Information 
Privacy, 92 NEB. L. REV. 746, 789-91 (2014) (discussing the application of the 
newsworthiness test).  
 103. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2812 (“Unlike publicity rights, which 
arise under preemptable state law, the freedom of speech is expressly and supremely 
protected under the First Amendment. Thus, an individual’s publicity rights 
generally end—full stop—when another individual’s free speech begins.”). 
 104. See id. (noting federal law, under the Supremacy Clause, preempts the 
state laws when publicity protections hinder freedom of speech). 
 105. Compare Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 
811 (Cal. 2001), and Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013), 
with Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 890 (2003). See also infra Section I.B 
(regarding the relevance of California right of publicity laws). 
 106. See Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 786-91 n.234-59 (discussing 
various cases, many within California courts or the Ninth Circuit, that utilize the 
transformative and newsworthiness balancing tests, suggesting that California is an 
ideal example jurisdiction to discuss differing outcomes under these balancing tests). 
 107. See id.; Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2811-14.  
 108. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 787. This definition of the 
transformativeness test is derived from the California Supreme Court in Comedy III 
Prods. Inc. Id. The Comedy III Court noted that the transformation could take many 
forms and was not to be limited to the known types, such as parodies. Id. at 809. 
When a work is transformed to make an expressive point, the unauthorized use is 
then allowed as protected speech under the First Amendment. See Stern & Stern, 
supra note 39, at 102. The transformative test can sometimes be broken into two 
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Saderup, Inc., the Supreme Court of California found that an artist’s 
work depicting The Three Stooges with only trivial variation from 
the original portrayal showed no significant transformation or 
creative contribution, and so the First Amendment did not protect the 
work; the right of publicity prevailed.109 The court explained that 
depictions of celebrities that were little more than a rendition of what 
made the celebrity’s likeness economically valuable were not 
protected under the First Amendment, but that expressive uses of the 
likeness, such as a parody, were protected.110 The court further 
explained that when a work is transformative it no longer risks 
impeding the economic value derived from the person’s likeness that 
the right of publicity aims to protect.111 Similarly, in Keller v. 
Electronic Arts Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the literal depiction 
of a college athlete in a video game was not afforded First 
Amendment protection because the player was shown in the setting 
in which he was made famous, so there was no transformative aspect 
of the work.112  
                                                                                                       
subcategories: transformative work and transformative use. Id. The transformative 
work test “asks whether a work uses the plaintiff’s likeness as merely one piece of a 
much broader work; if it does, the right of publicity claim must fail.” Id. The 
transformative use test “asks whether the celebrity’s likeness itself has been 
distorted or altered; if it has not, the right of publicity claim may proceed.” Id.  
 109. 21 P.3d at 800, 811. See also Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 788 (“In 
assessing transformativeness, a court analyzes the defendant’s expressive project, 
not the type of expression first created by the plaintiff.”). Notably, intent is not a 
factor that is considered. Id. 
 110. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 805-07 (“Once the celebrity thrusts himself or 
herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment dictates that the right to 
comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the celebrity 
image must be given broad scope. . . . What the right of publicity holder possesses is 
not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating the 
economic value generated by the celebrity’s fame.”). 
 111. Id. at 808 (explaining when a work is transformative it brings to life the 
new expression by the defendant and thus fosters the free expression and speech that 
the First Amendment does protect). 
 112. 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013). The Keller court looked to the five 
factors set forth in Comedy III to determine if a work is transformative. Id. at 1274. 
The first factor is whether the defendant used the raw material of the final work or 
imitated the final work itself. Id. The second factor is to determine if the defendant 
added his or her own expression that is protected. Id. The third factor is whether the 
literal or the creative elements predominate the defendant’s work. Id. The fourth 
factor is the economic and market impact the defendant’s work has on the original 
work. Id. And the fifth factor is whether the work is merely a conventional portrait 
of the celebrity to exploit that celebrity’s fame. Compare id., with 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(1992) (listing the four factors of the copyright fair use test). See also Hart v. Elec. 
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (following the California Supreme 
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In contrast, in Winter v. DC Comics, the Supreme Court of 
California held that the characterized depiction of musicians Johnny 
and Edgar Winter into comic books were transformative and creative 
enough to allow the work to be protected under the First 
Amendment.113 Though it was obvious that the comic books were 
illustrating the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were not depicted literally.114 
The brothers were depicted as cartoons with worm-like bodies, 
which made this work transformative, and thus it was afforded First 
Amendment protection.115 Whether a work transforms the person’s 
image could determine whether the work is afforded First 
Amendment protection or if it could be blocked by the person’s right 
of publicity claim—for example, Chris Baldwin stopping Cincy 
Shirts from using his image or not.116 While some courts in California 
use the transformative test, other courts within California rely on 
alternate tests, such as newsworthiness, use for profit, and the core 
speech test.117 
2. Other Tests Available to the Courts: Newsworthiness, 
Profits, and Core Speech 
There are several other tests that are used to determine if a 
defendant has First Amendment protection in right of publicity 
                                                                                                       
Court’s application of the transformative test). In Hart, like Keller, the defendant 
created a video game of collegiate athletes. Id. at 146. The court held that creating a 
player into a video game avatar was not transformative enough to escape the right of 
publicity meaning there was no First Amendment protection. Id. at 166-69. In 
looking to make realistic portrayals of the college athletes, the avatars of the athletes 
were not transformed. Id. at 168. 
 113. 69 P.3d 473, 480 (Cal. 2003) (“Here, by contrast, defendants essentially 
sold, and the buyers purchased, DC Comics depicting fanciful, creative characters, 
not pictures of the Winter brothers. This makes all the difference. The comic books 
here are entitled to First Amendment protection.”).  
 114. See id. at 479. 
 115. See id. at 476, 479 (“We can readily ascertain that they are not just 
conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain significant expressive content other 
than plaintiffs’ mere likenesses. Although the fictional characters Johnny and Edgar 
Autumn are less-than-subtle evocations of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books do 
not depict plaintiffs literally.”). The Winter Court held that the defendants only used 
the raw materials and created an expressive work that was protected. Id. at 479. 
 116. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 789 (explaining that the 
transformative test is similar to the fair use prong in copyright law regarding the 
purpose and character of the second work and thus is part of the determination of 
whether unauthorized use is permissible). 
 117. See id. at 789-90 (explaining that, unlike the transformativeness test, the 
newsworthiness test does not have any consideration under copyright fair use).  
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lawsuits, but these tests are not as popular as the transformative 
test.118 One of the more prominent tests aside from 
transformativeness is the “newsworthiness” defense.119 This analysis 
is determined by “whether the defendant’s work concerns [some] 
matter of public interest.”120 However, courts have not been 
consistent on what matters are defined as concerning the public 
interest.121 In many contexts, courts apply a broad meaning to what is 
considered news; for example, one case suggested “liking” 
information on Facebook makes that information newsworthy.122 By 
taking this approach, courts look to the defendant’s actions to 
determine what is newsworthy and in the public interest instead of 
considering and relying on the right the plaintiff is trying to 
protect.123  
Another defense is the CBC test, which asks the court whether 
the likeness of the person has been used solely for profit.124 If the 
purpose was to sell the product, then the publicity claim can 
prevail.125 In C.B.C. Distributing and Manufacturing, Inc. v. Major 
                                                 
 118. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 101, 103 (“Recognizing the 
dangers that an overly broad right of publicity could pose to the First Amendment, 
various courts have struggled to create a test that balances publicity interests with 
free speech rights.”). 
 119. See Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 789-90 (“A newsworthiness 
defense exempts journalistic uses of celebrity, even when the journalism at issue 
consists of only mundane celebrity gossip.”).  
 120. Id. at 790 (internal quotation omitted) (“As with the transformativeness 
defense, the newsworthiness defense focuses on the nature of the defendant’s work, 
not the character of the interest held by the plaintiff.”). 
 121. See id. (“Although one court has attempted to limit the definition of 
public interest, others hold that even works of entertainment receive constitutional 
protection under the newsworthiness exception if they fulfill an ‘informative 
role.’”). 
 122. See id. The case in which the court suggested liking information on 
Facebook is deemed newsworthy is Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804-
05 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Id. at 790-91. See also Hoisington, supra note 18 
(“‘Newsworthy’ generally means news and factual information relating to public 
issues and entertaining information about a person.”). 
 123. See Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 791 (“This can hold true even if 
the defendant obviously employed the plaintiff’s persona for a commercial purpose. 
For example, when the San Jose Mercury News took quarterback Joe Montana’s 
likeness not only for its front page, but also to sell commemorative posters, the court 
immunized the use under the newsworthiness exceptions.”) (citing Montana v. San 
Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 642, 643 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 124. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 102. 
 125. See id. (explaining that the test “asks whether the defendant’s likeness 
has been used explicitly to sell a product; if it has, the right of publicity claim may 
proceed”). 
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League Baseball Advanced Media, the Eighth Circuit held that an 
online fantasy baseball company’s right in offering baseball statistics 
superseded the players’ right of publicity because the statistics were 
not distributed for profit and it was in the public interest to 
disseminate the information.126 Another test is known as the core 
speech test, which asks whether the person’s likeness is used for 
“news, entertainment, creative works, or political contexts,” and if 
so, the “publicity claim must fail.”127 A final test that has been used 
by courts is the predominant use test, which asks whether the 
person’s likeness has been used by the defendant in a predominantly 
expressive way.128 If the use is expressive, the publicity claim fails, 
and conversely, if the use is predominantly commercial, the publicity 
claim can proceed.129 
With no federal guidance, states are left to determine if there 
should be a right of publicity law and, if so, what the scope of it 
should be.130 Many states have codified the right into statute, but 
many have decided to let the courts establish a common law right 
instead.131 This then creates a problem of significant differences in 
right of publicity protection amongst the states that could lead to 
varying decisions where there are similar facts.132 Or in some states, 
an aggrieved plaintiff does not have the right to bring a right of 
publicity at all—this is true in nine states.133 There is also the balance 
that must be struck between the right of publicity and the First 
                                                 
 126. 505 F.3d 818, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 127. Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 102 (explaining that both the CBC test 
and the core speech test protect speech but have not been used much in recent 
history). 
 128. See id.  
 129. See id. at 102-03 (“This test allows strikingly little breathing room for 
freedom of expression and has been rejected by most courts that have had occasion 
to consider it.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 14-15 (describing how privacy 
laws have been left to the states to develop, and thus the right of publicity, stemming 
from privacy laws, has also developed through state laws, leading to a “spasmodic” 
development of publicity laws with divergent and controversial justifications). 
 131. See Sager, supra note 52, at 1-2 (discussing various state statutes, such 
as New York and California, and common law standards for what right of publicity 
laws protect in different jurisdictions). 
 132. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (“Although there is a trend 
toward more states recognizing a right of publicity, there is a dramatic lack of 
uniformity concerning the scope and substance of the rights of publicity recognized 
by different states.”). 
 133. See Smith, supra note 58, at 2108-16. 
888 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
Amendment, which can be difficult to determine.134 Not only is there 
a difficulty determining what the right of publicity protects from 
state to state and the balance with the First Amendment, there is also 
the issue of the right of publicity often being preempted by federal 
copyright law.135 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AND ITS (SOMETIMES) PREEMPTION OF THE 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Copyright law is designed to protect the property rights of the 
author of the creative work.136 However, with the expansion of the 
Copyright Act, there has been conflict between federal copyright law 
and the state right of publicity laws.137 On one hand, some courts 
have held that, based on the language of the Copyright Act, the state 
law is preempted by the federal law because both protect the same 
rights.138 On the other hand, some courts have held that the right of 
publicity law protects different rights than the Copyright Act, and so 
                                                 
 134. Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2812; see also Stern & Stern, supra note 
39, at 103 (“In recent years, courts have generally relied upon the third or fourth 
tests—transformative work or transformative use—when dealing with right of 
publicity in video game lawsuits. The transformative use test in particular has risen 
to prominence in a number of jurisdictions, though this test significantly cramps 
expression and has led to some questionable results.”). 
 135. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 702 (“Section 301(a) provides that any 
state law, whether based on common law or statute, is subject to federal preemption 
if: (1) it creates ‘legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106’; and (2) 
such rights under state law may be claimed in ‘works of authorship that are fixed in 
a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of 
copyright.’”). 
 136. See Eric E. Johnson, The NFL, Intellectual Property, and the Conquest 
of Sports Media, 86 N.D. L. REV. 759, 767 (2010) (“[T]he general rule in U.S. 
copyright law is that the person who operates the camera is the author of the footage, 
and that the author of the footage is the owner of the copyright in it.”). The author of 
the copyrighted work is often the person who is the “owner” of that creative work. 
Id. It should be noted that there are some exceptions that can change the ownership 
of the work to someone else, so this is merely a general rule, not an absolute rule. Id.  
 137. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 705-06 (explaining that the legislative 
history of § 301 of the Copyright Act makes the status of misappropriation unclear 
in terms of preemption, leading to an issue among publicity laws, as many of them 
stem from the misappropriation prong of privacy laws). 
 138. See James M. Chadwick & Roxana Vatanparast, The Copyright Act’s 
Preemption of Right of Publicity Claims, 25 COMM. LAW. 3, 3-4 (2008) (noting § 
301 does not define what is equivalent under the statute). 
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the state law is not preempted.139 For example, Chris Baldwin, the 
“Sad Michigan Fan,” may or may not have a successful right of 
publicity claim, depending on if the jurisdiction where the lawsuit is 
brought determines the right is preempted by the rights of the 
University of Michigan and ESPN, the copyright holders.140 The 
difficulty is that there is no obvious pattern to the decisions, as courts 
in the same jurisdiction or even the same court have decided cases 
both ways.141 The protection of copyrighted material must also be 
balanced with the fair use doctrine and contracted licenses of the 
copyrighted work.142 
A. History of Federal Copyright Law  
Federal copyright protection became firmly established in the 
United States in 1787, when the Constitution granted authors and 
inventors exclusive rights to their writings and discoveries to 
promote progress in the arts and sciences.143 As derived from the 
language of the Constitution, the authors and inventors could obtain 
this exclusive right for “limited times.”144 In 1790, the first copyright 
                                                 
 139. See id. at 4-5 (“Courts have reached differing conclusions with respect 
to whether right of publicity claims are preempted by copyright law.”). 
 140. See id. at 4. 
 141. See id. at 4-5. There are, however, a few trends that emerge. Id. at 4. 
First, preemption is determined based on the individual claim. Id. Second, in cases 
involving a right of publicity claim with an otherwise authorized use of a 
copyrighted image, courts have often found that the claim was preempted. Id. Third, 
courts have often found no preemption when the celebrity’s name, likeness, or 
image is used independent of an authorized copyrighted work. Id. 
 142. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Dual-Grant Theory of 
Fair Use, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2016) (“Fair use is a keystone of the law 
of copyright; the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that fair use is a 
constitutionally mandated limitation on copyright in order to avoid conflicts between 
the First Amendment’s free speech protections and the monopoly rights copyright 
owners receive over expressions.”); see also Johnson, supra note 136, at 763 (“In 
the 1970s, assignments of copyright by telecasters to sports organizers were unheard 
of. Yet today, such assignments are routine—virtually all organizers obtain a 
copyright assignment as part of their deal to have a game televised.”). 
 143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). This was modeled after the 
more restrictive copyright statutes used for government censorship and press control 
in England and its subsequent Statute of Anne. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., 
COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 23-25 (4th ed. 2015). 
 144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of 
Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 613, 623 (2014) (explaining 
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law established the owner of a copyright could have exclusive rights 
to his or her work for fourteen years.145  
As copyright law developed, it was expanded to protect more 
creative works.146 For example, in 1802, the 1790 Act was amended 
to include historical and other prints.147 In 1831, a general revision of 
the copyright law added musical compositions to the list of 
protectable works and increased the term of protection for all works 
to twenty-eight years with a renewal for another fourteen years.148 
Three years later, in 1834, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 
its first copyright law case, holding that authors of unpublished 
works had perpetual rights to their unpublished work, but as soon as 
it was published, statutory provisions limited the protection.149 
                                                                                                       
the limitation on time comes directly from the Constitution and is a central feature to 
federal copyright law). 
 145. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Jiayang Sun & Yiying Fan, Does 
Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2009). While the duration of a copyright began at 
fourteen years, the duration has steadily increased with an expansion of copyright 
law. Id. This is due to the fact that copyright laws allow for the exclusive right of the 
work to the copyright owner, which acts as a reward system to assist in fostering 
more creativity. Id. at 1671. 
[I]n 1790, copyright originally provided authors the exclusive right to 
vend books and maps for fourteen years with an additional fourteen years 
of protection available through renewal. Currently, copyright protects all 
original expression fixed in a tangible medium of expression, which 
includes books, motion pictures, sound recordings, broadcasts of sporting 
events, and video games. It provides authors the exclusive right to control 
almost all uses of their writings—even the ability to create new works 
based upon the original. Moreover, this protection generally lasts for the 
life of the author plus an additional seventy years. 
Id. at 1670-71. See also COHEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 25-26 (noting that in the 
beginning, copyright owners had to comply with various formalities, including 
registering the title, publishing the registration in a newspaper, and depositing a 
copy with the secretary of state within six months). 
 146. See The 18th Century, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/ 
timeline/timeline_18th_century.html [http://perma.cc/9Q7J-NZMY] (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2017) (noting that the original law from 1790 only protected books, maps, 
and charts). 
 147. See id. This was the first expansion of copyrightable works. Id.  
 148. See id. The original length of time of fourteen years was copied from 
the English Statute of Anne. Id. This was the first time that the United States 
expanded its copyright protections in regards to length of time of protection. Id.  
 149. See The 19th Century, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_19th_century.html [perma.cc/W557-
98A6] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 591-92 
(1834). The Court held in Wheaton that court opinions could not have copyrights as 
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Continuing through the 1800s, other works of art were included 
under copyright law, including dramatic works and photographs.150 
The Supreme Court, in 1880, acted to limit what works were 
protected under copyright laws.151 The Court held that general ideas 
or common knowledge could not be copyrighted, despite the fact the 
knowledge was fixed in a tangible medium.152 
The 1909 Copyright Act created a dual system of state and 
federal copyright laws, distinguishing between published and 
unpublished works.153 In 1947, copyright law was officially codified 
into Title Seventeen of the United States Code.154 With many new 
forms of creative work added to copyright protection as new 
technology was introduced, the Supreme Court once again limited 
the subject matter of copyrights.155 In Mazer v. Stein, the Court held 
that only artistic works, not any utilitarian aspect of that work, could 
be copyrighted.156 
                                                                                                       
unpublished documents, but the written opinion summaries could. Id. at 622, 668. 
This case also abolished any idea of common law copyright protection. Id. at 663. 
 150. See The 19th Century, supra note 149. Following this, the Act was 
expanded to include protection for visual art (1870), right of public performance for 
dramatic works (1856), musical compositions (1897), and the right to create 
derivative works (1870). See The 18th Century, supra note 146. 
 151. See The 19th Century, supra note 149; see also Baker v. Seldon, 101 
U.S. 99, 100-01 (1880), overruled by Mazer v. Stein 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). 
 152. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100-01. Baker involved copyright infringement of a 
bookkeeping ledger. Id. at 100. The Court held that the author’s original writing of 
the ideas expressed within the book was copyrightable subject matter, but the 
property common to the public was not. Id. at 100-01. 
 153. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the 
Preemption Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 
6-7 (2007) (“As a practical matter, this meant that state protection extended only to 
works that the author was not (yet) exploiting commercially. No affirmative steps 
were needed to secure common law copyright. After ‘publication,’ i.e., after the 
author undertook some form of commercial distribution of his or her work, 
protection under state law was no longer available. At that point, the copyright 
owner was required to take several steps to obtain federal protection.”). 
 154. See 1900-1950, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/ 
timeline/timeline_1900-1950.html [perma.cc/EA92-XYGU] (last visited Nov. 6, 
2017). 
 155. See 1950-1997, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/ 
timeline/timeline_1950-1997.html [perma.cc/CPR8-BASK] (last visited Nov. 6, 
2017). 
 156. 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“[A]rtistic articles are protected ‘in form but 
not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects.’ The dichotomy of protection for the 
aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of 
original and ornamental design for design patents.”) (citation omitted). 
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The Copyright Act of 1976 was the next significant change to 
copyright law.157 This created a single federal system for original 
works of art, whether published or unpublished.158 While the 1976 
Act was the most recent fundamental change, there have been other 
changes in copyright law since, including the addition of more works 
protected under the copyright law and the extension of copyright 
protection term.159 Today, copyright allows protection of all original 
expressions fixed in a tangible medium for the life of the author plus 
an additional seventy years.160 In regards to images, videos, and any 
other pictures, the owner of the copyrighted image is the person who 
operates the camera, not the people actually in the image.161 Federal 
copyright law continues to grow as technological advances are 
introduced and the world becomes more integrated with 
globalization, which can affect the force of other laws.162  
B. Copyright’s Preemption of State Law  
The Copyright Act of 1976 had the effect of further expanding 
federal preemption of state law.163 Section 301(a)164 contains a two-
                                                 
 157. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 701 (explaining that this Act and its 
adoption of § 301 was the most fundamental change in federal copyright law since 
its inception). 
 158. See id. (“It create[d] a single system of federal protection for all 
‘original works of authorship,’ published or unpublished, from the moment they are 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”). 
 159. See 1950-1997, supra note 155; see also 1998-2012, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1998-2012.html [perma.cc/ 
H4Y4-2ENL] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). Some of these expansions include 
computer programs becoming copyrightable (1980), the United States joining the 
Berne Convention (1989), copyright term extension to author’s life plus seventy 
years (1998), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998). Additionally, the 
United States has become signatories to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
Performances (2012) and the Marrakesh Treaty (2013). 
 160. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 162. See 2013 and Beyond, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_2013-beyond.html [perma.cc/GHF7-
G8FV] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act also 
“limit[s] online infringement liability for Internet service providers, create[s] a form 
of protection for vessel hulls, and clarifie[s] the role of the Copyright Office.” See 
1998-2012, supra note 159. In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was 
passed, which provided for the implementation of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty and 
further clarified the role of the Copyright Office. See id. 
 163. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 702 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)-(b) 
(1998)). 
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prong test to determine whether federal copyright law preempts state 
law.165 The state law is preempted if: (1) it creates a legal right that is 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights166 under the scope of 
copyright law;167 and (2) the state right may be claimed in works of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression within the 
subject matter of copyright law.168 Based on the wording of this 
statute, states may not protect interests that are equivalent to those 
covered by copyright law, but they may protect nonequivalent 
rights.169 
                                                                                                       
 164. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1998) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or 
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 [17 U.S.C. § 106] in works of 
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the 
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 [17 U.S.C. §§ 102 
and 103], whether created before or after that date and whether published or 
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled 
to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or 
statutes of any State.”). 
 165. See id.; see also Shipley, supra note 56, at 702 (explaining state law is 
preempted whether the state law is based in common law or in statute). 
 166. See § 106. The six exclusive rights of copyright law are: (1) the right to 
reproduce the work; (2) the right to prepare derivative works; (3) the right to 
distribute copies; (4) the right to perform works publicly; (5) the right to display 
copyrighted work publicly; and (6) the right to perform work publicly by digital 
audio transmission. Id. 
 167. See §§ 102-104 (discussing the subject matter and protections under 
federal copyright law). 
 168. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 702. However, § 301(b) preserves state 
rights for when the work of authorship is not fixed in a tangible medium. Id. See 
also § 301(b); supra note 164 and accompanying text. Section 301(b) states: 
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or 
statutes of any State with respect to 
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of 
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 [17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 
103], including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression; or 
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before 
January 1, 1978; 
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to 
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by section 106 [17 U.S.C. § 106]; or 
(4) State and local landmarks, historic preservation, zoning, or building 
codes, relating to architectural works protected under section 102(a)(8) [17 
U.S.C. § 102(a)(8)]. 
§ 301(b). 
 169. See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 56, at 702-03 (“Thus, states may protect 
interests that are not equivalent to those protected by copyright as well as 
noncopyrightable subject matter. All rights equivalent to copyright in works within 
894 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
Although the language of § 301(a) may appear clear on its face, 
its effects when applied are uncertain.170 There is no consensus 
between courts, both within the same state and between states, on 
what exactly an “equivalent right” is.171 The test adopted by many 
courts decides (1) whether the subject matter protected under state 
law is also protected under § 102 of the Copyright Act and (2) 
whether the state law rights are equivalent to rights under § 301 of 
the Copyright Act.172 Despite using this test, courts in all jurisdictions 
have come to differing conclusions on whether the right of publicity 
is or is not preempted.173 
1. Cases in Which Courts Found that Right of Publicity Was 
Preempted 
Various courts have held that the “exclusive rights” protected 
by the Copyright Act encompass the rights protected under right of 
                                                                                                       
the subject matter of copyright are now governed exclusively by federal law.”). For 
example, protecting one’s image and use of that image could be considered a 
different right than protecting a photograph of that image and the use of that specific 
photograph. See Toney v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that a person’s image is different than a photograph of that person). 
Applied to Chris Baldwin, a nonequivalent right would be exemplified by the 
difference in Baldwin protecting the use of his image in any context compared to the 
University of Michigan protecting the one still image of the broadcast of Baldwin at 
the football game. See id. On the other hand, both of the rights are centered on the 
protection of Baldwin’s image, and thus a court could consider the rights to be 
equivalent. See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 
663, 677 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining the right of publicity is equivalent to copyright 
if infringing on the right of publicity also infringes the copyright). 
 170. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 703 (“Determining the scope of the 
preemption under the 1976 Act involves two inquiries: (1) what constitutes 
noncopyrightable subject matter; and (2) what rights are not equivalent to those 
granted under the copyright law?”). Additionally, the language of § 301 is especially 
uncertain where it is not clear if federal copyright law applies directly. Id. 
 171. See id. at 703, 697-98. 
 172. See Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 138, at 3-4 (“Courts have 
reached differing conclusions with respect to whether right of publicity claims are 
preempted by copyright law. . . . A comparison of pairs of cases, often from the 
same jurisdictions, that reach different conclusions illustrates where most courts will 
draw the line.”). 
 173. See id. at 6 (“The Copyright Act preempts inconsistent state law claims. 
However, right of publicity claims are neither uniformly preempted nor uniformly 
exempt from preemption. The nominal test for preemption of right of publicity 
claims has produced a confusing and inconsistent body of law. At present, it is 
difficult to predict whether a right of publicity claim will be preempted by the 
Copyright Act.”). 
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publicity laws, and therefore the state law is preempted.174 For 
example, in Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit held that the misappropriation claim was within the subject 
matter of copyright law and that the rights under California Law 
were equivalent to those protected under the Copyright Act.175 The 
plaintiff was a vocalist who gave a copy of her recording to a 
recording company that subsequently used her voice in another 
artist’s song.176 The court found that the right of publicity and 
copyright are both mechanisms for an individual to protect his or her 
artistic works and thus copyright preempts the right of publicity.177  
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar outcome in Baltimore 
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association.178 The 
Seventh Circuit found that a telecast of a baseball game fell within 
the scope of the subject matter of copyright law.179 In balancing 
copyrights and right of publicity, the court defined an equivalent 
right as a right that is infringed by the mere act of reproductions, 
performance, distractions, or display, and thus the broadcast fell 
within an equivalent right.180 The baseball players claimed a right of 
publicity in their televised performance, but the court found this was 
preempted as both the right of publicity and copyright protect the 
promotion of performances to the public.181 
                                                 
 174. See id. at 3-6. Chadwick and Vatanparast examine cases within the 
same jurisdiction that have been decided for and against preemption. Id. The 
common theme found in determining if preemption should occur was based on the 
specific use of the copyrighted work. Id. at 6.  
 175. 448 F.3d 1134, 1139, 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Both copyright and 
the right of publicity are means of protecting an individual’s investment in his or her 
artistic labors.”). 
 176. Id. at 1136. 
 177. Id. at 1145 (noting that if the elements of the publicity claim differed 
from the elements and evidence of the copyright infringement claim, then there 
would likely not be preemption as different rights would be involved). 
 178. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 179. Id. at 674-77 (“[A] right is equivalent to one of the rights comprised by 
a copyright if it is infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, 
distribution or display.”). 
 180. Id. at 676-77. 
 181. Id. at 677-78 (“The purpose of federal copyright protection is to benefit 
the public by encouraging works in which it is interested. To induce individuals to 
undertake the personal sacrifices necessary to create such works, federal copyright 
law extends to the authors of such works a limited monopoly to reap the rewards of 
their endeavors. . . . The reason that state law protects individual pecuniary interests 
is to provide an incentive to performers to invest the time and resources required to 
develop such performances.”). The court specifically noted, however, that the 
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In Daboub v. Gibbons, the Fifth Circuit held that a singer’s 
claim that the defendant improperly copied his song, though brought 
under right of publicity, was an interest protected by the Copyright 
Act.182 The court found that there was no “disharmony” between the 
state law claims and federal claims, and thus the federal copyright 
claim preempted the state right of publicity claim.183 Therefore the 
Fifth Circuit found that there was equivalency of rights pursuant to § 
301(a) of the Copyright Act, and the plaintiff could not bring a right 
of publicity claim.184 
The Eastern District of Michigan, in Armstrong v. Eagle Rock 
Entertainment, Inc., held that the plaintiff’s recorded performance of 
playing the bass was preempted by federal copyright law.185 The 
court found that the motion picture fell within the subject matter of 
the Copyright Act, and the right to reproduce one’s work was an 
exclusive right under the Copyright Act.186 With both prongs of the 
preemption test satisfied, the right of publicity claim could not be 
successful as the proper cause of action was for the copyright holder 
to sue for copyright infringement.187 Circuit courts, district courts, 
                                                                                                       
players’ right of publicity would not be preempted under certain circumstances. Id. 
at 676 n.24. In doing so, the court stated: 
The Players’ rights of publicity in their performances are preempted only 
if they would be violated by the exercise of the Clubs’ copyright in the 
telecasts. A player’s right of publicity in his name or likeness would not be 
preempted if a company, without the consent of the player, used the 
player’s name to advertise its product. 
Id.  
 182. 42 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1995) (determining that the plaintiff “failed 
to allege or produce any evidence of ‘any element, such as an invasion of personal 
rights or a breach of fiduciary duty, which render [their claims] different in kind 
from copyright infringement’”). 
 183. Id. at 290 (“Finding no disharmony between the elements of the state 
law claims and the federal law in this case, we have no hesitancy in pronouncing 
enough equivalency to satisfy [27 U.S.C.] § 301(a).”). 
 184. Id.   
 185. 655 F. Supp. 2d 779, 789 (E.D. Mich. 2009). The court found that the 
motion picture was subject matter covered by §§ 102-103 of the Copyright Act and 
as such met the first requirement of the § 301 preemption test. Id. The court then 
found that the right that was being asserted by the plaintiff was found in § 106 of the 
Copyright Act, and thus there was preemption. Id.  
 186. Id. at 789-90. 
 187. Id. at 790 (“Thus, even though Plaintiff’s claim is couched as an 
appropriation of likeness claim, it is really a copyright violation claim. If Plaintiff 
believes he has a right in the recording and a right to receive a share of the profits 
from its reproduction, the appropriate target of such a claim is the copyright 
holder.”). 
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and state courts have all heard similar matters and have decided that 
the state right of publicity laws are preempted by federal copyright 
law.188 
2. Cases in Which Courts Found that Right of Publicity Was 
Not Preempted 
However, the same courts have also held that the “exclusive 
rights” protected by the Copyright Act do not encompass the rights 
protected under right of publicity laws, and therefore the state law is 
not preempted.189 In Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the protection of publicity claims was of an 
individual’s name and likeness, which is not a work of authorship 
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.190 The defendant had 
obtained the right to images from a surfing competition to use in 
promoting its new surfing themed clothing line.191 The Ninth Circuit 
differentiated the picture from the image within the photograph.192 
The court held that the photograph itself was protected by copyright, 
but the defendant had gone beyond simply reprinting the photograph 
by using the surfers’ images and names in a way that suggested the 
surfers in the photograph were promoting the clothing brand.193 This 
use of the surfers’ names and likenesses was held to be different than 
                                                 
 188. See generally Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Can. Inc., 617 F.3d 
1146, 1153-55 (9th Cir. 2010); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 
2d. 884, 888-89 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Stanford v. Caesars Entm’t, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 
2d 749, 759 (W.D. Tenn. 2006); Rainey v. Wayne State Univ., 26 F. Supp. 2d 963, 
973 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Brown v. ACMI Pop Div., 873 N.E.2d 954, 960-61 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007). 
 189. See Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 138, at 4-5 (discussing various 
cases within the same jurisdiction that found for and against preemption). 
 190. 265 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he subject matter of the 
Appellants’ statutory and common law right of publicity claims is their names and 
likenesses, which are not copyrightable, the claims are not equivalent to the 
exclusive rights contained in § 106.”).  
 191. Id. at 1002. 
 192. Id. at 1003 (“The photograph itself, as a pictorial work of authorship, is 
subject matter protected by the Copyright Act. . . . [I]t is not the publication of the 
photograph itself, as a creative work of authorship, that is the basis for Appellants’ 
claims, but rather, it is the use of the Appellants’ likenesses and their names pictured 
in the published photograph.”). 
 193. See id. 
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the use of the photograph and was not protected under the Copyright 
Act, and thus the surfers’ right of publicity claim could prevail.194 
In Toney v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that 
the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim was not preempted under 
Illinois law, even while recognizing its previous decision in 
Baltimore Orioles.195 The model whose image was used to endorse a 
product without her consent wished to protect the commercial aspect 
of her image as allowed under Illinois law.196 The court held that this 
right was not protected by copyright law, so the Copyright Act did 
not preempt, despite the fact that the image in question was 
copyrighted by the defendant.197 
The Fifth Circuit has also been split as seen in Brown v. Ames, 
where the court held that the tort of misappropriation was intended to 
protect a person’s persona, which did not fall within the subject 
matter of the Copyright Act.198 The court further held that 
misappropriation does not fit within the Copyright Act even if the 
name or likeness used is in a copyrighted work.199 The court 
                                                 
 194. See id. at 1004-05 (finding the names and likeness of the appellants 
were separated from the copyrightable image as noncopyrightable subject matter 
that could be protected by the right of publicity without being preempted). 
 195. 406 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit clarified that 
Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), had been widely criticized as 
holding that any right of publicity claim was preempted by copyright. Id. Here, the 
court chose to clarify that this was only true when the state law claim intruded on the 
domain of copyright law, as “[s]uch a result is essential in order to preserve the 
extent of the public domain established by copyright law.” Id. See also supra 
Subsection II.B.1.  
 196. Toney, 406 F.3d at 910 (“One can imagine many scenarios where the 
use of a photograph without consent, in apparent endorsement of any number of 
products, could cause great harm to the person photographed. . . . The defendants 
did not have [the plaintiff’s] consent to continue to use the photograph, and 
therefore, they stripped [the plaintiff] of her right to control the commercial value of 
her identity.”). 
 197. See id. (“A person’s likeness—her persona—is not authored and it is 
not fixed. The fact that an image of the person might be fixed in a copyrightable 
photograph does not change this.”). 
 198. 201 F.3d 654, 661 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Supreme Court precedent 
suggesting that courts should steer a middle ground in considering Copyright Act 
preemption cases supports our conclusion that appellees’ misappropriation claims 
are not preempted.”). In Brown, musicians, songwriters, and music producers sued a 
record label and its producer, Ames, for the use of the plaintiffs’ songs, names, and 
likenesses in cassettes and compact discs and in music catalogs, posters, and 
videotapes without permission. Id. at 656-67. 
 199. See id. at 661 (“Since appellees’ misappropriation claims neither fall 
within the subject matter of copyright nor conflict with the purposes and objectives 
of the Copyright Act, the claims were not preempted.”). 
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distinguished its prior decision in Daboub because Daboub involved 
a controversy concerning a song that was the source of both the 
copyright infringement and misappropriation claim, whereas the 
present case only involved the misappropriation claim, and so it was 
not preempted.200  
In Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., the New York Supreme Court 
decided that the right of publicity of New York Mets players was not 
preempted when images of their faces were placed on shirts and sold 
without their consent.201 The shirt was licensed by Major League 
Baseball to be sold.202 Despite this license, the court determined that 
the New York laws included an extra element of “use for advertising 
purposes” that was not protected under copyright law, and thus the 
publicity rights were not preempted.203 The players were entitled to 
exploit the marketability of their names and images that came from 
winning a World Series that was different than the protection of 
images owned by the copyright holders.204 Circuit courts, district 
courts, and state courts have all heard similar matters and decided 
that the right of publicity is not preempted.205 
Whether someone like Chris Baldwin, the “Sad Michigan Fan,” 
could bring a right of publicity claim in conjunction with a copyright 
holder’s copyright infringement claim depends on whether a court 
deems the rights under each cause of action to be equivalent or not.206 
                                                 
 200. See id. at 658. The court distinguished Daboub, 42 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 
1995), because in Daboub the plaintiff claimed both copyright infringement and 
misappropriation of the same song. Id. The difference was that both claims were to 
the same song itself and the misappropriation was not based on use of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness. Id. See also supra Subsection II.B.1. 
 201. 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 935 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (“[A] right to publicity—
to the commercial exploitation of one’s identity—appears qualitatively different 
from copyright.”). 
 202. See id. at 931-32. 
 203. Id. at 935-36 (“In this court’s view, the extra element here is the ‘us[e] 
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, [of] the name, portrait or 
picture of any living person without [consent].”) (alteration in original).  
 204. Id. at 937 (“Protection of a personality with ‘marketable status,’ 
established by legislation and guarded by our courts, is the right we uphold today.”). 
 205. See generally Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 
853 (2d Cir. 1997); Bruce Lee Enters., L.L.C. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., No. 10-cv-2333, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31155, at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013); Apigram Pub’g. Co. 
v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. C78-525, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9738, at *4-5 (N.D. Ohio 
July 30, 1980); Brown v. A.M.C.I. Pop Div., 873 N.E.2d 954, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2007). 
 206. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 702-03, 735-36 (explaining that if the 
rights are deemed equivalent, the right of publicity claim will be preempted by the 
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It could also depend on how a state defines its right of publicity.207 A 
separate question that could affect whether the copyright 
infringement cause of action will be successful is whether the third 
party’s unauthorized use is allowed under the fair use doctrine.208 
C. Fair Use Defense to the Use of Copyrighted Material 
A separate issue in regards to copyrights is the fair use 
doctrine, which is the most prominent defense in a copyright 
infringement lawsuit.209 The fair use doctrine is codified as a four-
prong test210 that decides unauthorized, yet still permissible, uses of 
copyrighted material.211 The factors that courts consider and balance 
are: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature of the original 
work; (3) the amount of the original work used; and (4) the potential 
harm to the original work’s market.212 The fair use test assumes some 
level of unauthorized use of copyrighted works in order to promote 
the goals of copyright law, and thus a third party can use a 
                                                                                                       
federal copyright law regardless of whether a copyright infringement suit is 
brought).  
 207. See supra Subsections I.B.1-2. 
 208. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Taking Users’ 
Rights to the Next Level: A Pragmatist Approach to Fair Use, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (2015). The fair use doctrine is a test that determines if an 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is permissible based on the four-factor test. 
Id. at 7. 
 209. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 142, at 1053 (“The fair use 
defense to copyright infringement is perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated 
defense in the law of intellectual property. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly 
stated that fair use is a constitutionally mandated limitation on copyright in order to 
avoid conflicts between the First Amendment’s free speech protections and the 
monopoly rights copyright owners receive over expressions.”). 
 210. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“In determining whether the use made of a 
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include– 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”). 
 211. See Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, supra note 208, at 3 (“Fair use is a 
double-edged sword. It defines an open-norm for deciding permissible uses of 
copyrighted material based on a fairly ambiguous set of standards.”). 
 212. See § 107; see also Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, supra note 208, at 
7. 
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copyrighted image without permission of the copyright holder under 
this doctrine.213  
However, since courts have discretion to balance these factors, 
there is often a discrepancy as to which factors are more important.214 
In March 2015, the United States Supreme Court declined a petition 
to review Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation L.L.C.,215 which may have 
clarified how to balance the factors in the fair use test.216 Despite the 
discrepancies across jurisdictions, the fair use doctrine authorizes 
courts to apply the four factors to determine if a second work 
permissibly uses the original work.217 However, the jurisdiction may 
not be a factor if the parties have a contractual agreement about the 
use of likeness or copyrighted materials.218 
D. The Contractual Relationship Between Right of Publicity and 
Copyright in Sports 
In some circumstances, like a sporting event, there is also the 
issue of a contractual agreement between the event sponsor and the 
person attending the event through the terms and conditions the 
ticket purchaser must agree to.219 Protecting the sounds and images of 
sporting events became a significant aspect of sports with the 
                                                 
 213. See Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, supra note 208, at 7 (“Fair use 
assumes that some level of unlicensed use is permissible under copyright law and 
necessary in order to promote copyright goals.”). 
 214. See Andrea Weiss Jeffries & Kevin Goldman, High Court Will Need to 
Resolve Circuit Split in Fair Use, LAW 360 (Apr. 30, 2015, 10:54 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/645919/high-court-will-need-to-resolve-circuit-
split-in-fair-use [perma.cc/P3EF-MXGL] (explaining how the Supreme Court 
touched on the fair use doctrine over the years but has not squarely addressed it 
since its decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).  
 215. 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015). See also Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 
F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding defendant’s use was fair use, as almost none 
of the original image remained). 
 216. Compare Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (explaining that the fourth prong, 
market effect, is the most important), with Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (explaining the importance of the first prong and how transformative the 
second work was). 
 217. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, supra note 208, at 13 (“Fair 
use doctrine authorizes the courts to apply the four-factor analysis to particular 
cases, thereby constructing more concrete guidelines on permissible uses over 
time.”). 
 218. See Michigan State v. Michigan Football Ticket, supra note 30; see also 
Johnson, supra note 136, at 764 (explaining that the National Football League 
(NFL) has contractual agreements to own copyrights in every broadcasted game). 
 219. See Michigan State v. Michigan Football Ticket, supra note 30. 
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invention of the radio and television because broadcasts of events 
meant spectators of a sport could grow from an arena of thousands of 
live fans to a broadcast audience of hundreds of thousands—even 
millions.220 Prior to these technological advances, the main source of 
revenue for sports teams was selling tickets to live games.221 An 
example of the sports world acting to own its intellectual property—
the broadcast images of games—can be seen through the National 
Football League (NFL), which began producing and owning 
copyrighted works of on-field products in 1962.222 The NFL grants 
telecast rights to broadcast its games and takes the assignment of the 
copyright in its own name.223 Currently, the NFL registers every 
telecast professional football game with the Copyright Office.224 
The NFL claims a copyright to all game action and ancillary 
actions regardless of the source of such footage.225 This broad claim 
                                                 
 220. See Johnson, supra note 136, at 762-63 (“Beginning in the 1930s, 
however, organizers—leagues or home teams—began demanding payments from 
radio networks for the privilege of broadcasting games. The promotional benefit was 
no longer considered requisite compensation; fees had to be paid to the 
organizer. . . . The NFL first got into the business of owning intellectual property 
rights in moving images in the 1960s.”). Johnson also notes this trend continued 
with the NFL making movies out of its football games and eventually developed a 
film company, NFL Films. Id. 
 221. See id. at 762. “The National Football League (NFL) has been called 
‘the most successful sports league in history.’ It controls America’s ‘favorite’ sport 
with a business model that is ‘the envy of all other professional sports leagues.’” Id. 
at 760. 
 222. See id. at 763 (explaining that the NFL’s successful business model 
makes it an ideal example to discuss the nature of intellectual property in sports). 
 223. See id. at 764. Johnson explains that the NFL as a league negotiates its 
intellectual property. Id. He compares this to Major League Baseball, where it is not 
the league that negotiates, but each individual home team in Major League Baseball 
that grants the right to televise the event and take assignment of the televised 
footage. Id. Despite the difference in approach, the outcome is still the same in 
regards to the team or league owning the copyrighted televised event. Id. 
 224. See id. at 764-66 (“Through its business arrangements, the NFL has 
secured copyright ownership over the main coverage of every game. But the NFL’s 
ownership of telecast game coverage does not mean that it owns the copyright over 
all footage of every game. That is because the telecasters are not the only persons 
with cameras inside a stadium. Members of the local news media have long been 
allowed into stadiums to shoot video for their own news programs. And fans have 
long been able to shoot video with their camcorders. Yet sometime within the past 
10 years or so, the NFL has begun attempting to gain the copyright to this non-
telecaster footage as well.”). 
 225. See id. at 766 (“NFL game film or tape includes all footage of NFL 
game action, including footage of ancillary activities inside the stadium (e.g., 
cheerleaders, pre-game activities) regardless of the source of such footage.”). The 
 The “Sad Michigan Fan” 903 
of protection and ownership can also be seen through the licensing 
page for NFL Films, a subsidiary of the NFL, which claims exclusive 
ownership of all footage from three hours before the game to one 
hour after the game at any NFL-controlled event.226 This language 
expressly includes footage of the crowds as part of its copyrighted 
material, which could effectively eliminate any crowd member’s 
right of publicity claim against the NFL because the NFL owns that 
image.227 
This practice of protecting each possible copyright is also 
applicable for some football teams at the collegiate level.228 The 
University of Michigan is one of the schools that protects the images 
and footage of its games.229 In the case of Chris Baldwin becoming 
the “Sad Michigan Fan” for his shocked reaction that was caught on 
camera, the University of Michigan included terms and conditions on 
the back of its football tickets, including an express claim to the 
ownership of the ticket holder’s image, likeness, and statements, 
which allows the University of Michigan to own and use any image 
of Baldwin from the game.230 Thus, the ticket language eliminates 
any right of publicity claim of any fan or person against the 
University of Michigan as the copyright owner.231 In fact, this 
language more explicitly stops any right of publicity claim than the 
language used by the NFL as it directly mentions using the ticket 
holder’s image.232 Although the ticket language stops litigation 
                                                                                                       
NFL attempts to expand ownership from its own work and work of its licensed 
partners to other people or entities capturing these events. Id. 
 226. See id. at 767; see also Football Licensing, NFL FILMS, 
http://www.nflfilms.com/FootageRequest/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5N8K-
NUG7 (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“NFL Films, on behalf of the NFL, is the 
exclusive holder of all rights, including copyright rights, in and to all NFL footage, 
regardless of the source of such footage (this includes, but is not limited to, 
television coverage of games/events, footage shot on NFL sidelines with proper 
credentials, and NFL Films’ coverage). NFL copyrighted footage includes: (1) all 
footage of NFL game action, including footage of ancillary activities inside the 
stadium (e.g., cheerleaders, pre-game activities, crowd, sidelines, etc.) from the 
period three hours prior to kickoff of an NFL game to one hour after the NFL game 
has ended, and (2) NFL controlled events (i.e., Combine, NFL Draft, etc.).”). 
 227. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.   
 228. See Michigan State v. Michigan Football Ticket, supra note 30. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. (“The Holder of this ticket grants Michigan and its 
representative licenses and agents an unrestricted right and license to utilize 
Holder’s image, likeness, actions, and statements.”). 
 231. See id. 
 232. See id. Compare supra note 30 and accompanying text, with supra note 
226 and accompanying text. 
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between the image owner and the person in the image, there should 
still be causes of action for both the image owner and person in the 
image against a third party who uses the image without 
authorization.233 
The right to protect one’s image and likeness can depend on a 
jurisdiction’s interpretation of equivalent rights, which determines 
whether a person, like Chris Baldwin, can protect his or her image 
under right of publicity laws or if the only proper cause of action is a 
copyright infringement action brought by the copyright holder.234 If 
the person could not bring a right of publicity claim, he or she may 
not have any remedy if there is a contractual relationship between the 
person and the copyright owner, who can use the image at his or her 
discretion.235 With the conflict between federal copyright law and 
state right of publicity laws, looking to the Lanham Act could help 
guide the move toward a federal right of publicity statute.236 
III. A BRIEF INTERLUDE INTO THE LANHAM ACT 
The closest federal law analogous to state right of publicity 
laws is the Lanham Act.237 The right of publicity laws and Lanham 
Act cover similar scenarios in protecting against the unauthorized 
use of someone’s likeness; however, the Lanham Act is much 
narrower in scope.238 The Lanham Act is implicated when a 
celebrity’s personality is used specifically for false advertisement.239 
                                                 
 233. See Dewey, supra note 21 (discussing both right of publicity and 
copyright claims over the same image); Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2811 
(discussing the Lanham Act, which is a federal law that complements state right of 
publicity laws). 
 234. See Shipley, supra note 56, at 702-03 (explaining that if the rights are 
deemed equivalent, the only proper cause of action would be copyright infringement 
under federal copyright law brought by the copyright holder). 
 235. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2811 (explaining the Lanham Act is 
supplemental to the state right of publicity laws). 
 237. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (“However, although the right of 
publicity and the Lanham Act apply to some of the same situations, they are far from 
identical. In general, the right of publicity is significantly broader than the Lanham 
Act and applies to many situations in which the Lanham Act does not.”). 
 238. See id. (noting the Lanham Act is for false endorsement claims).  
 239. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2811 (“A complementary area of 
federal law, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, supplements state-law publicity rights 
by providing a civil action for false affiliation, designation of origin, or endorsement 
in connection with goods or services used in interstate commerce. Under the 
Lanham Act, a personality whose depiction has been used without permission may 
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For example, in White, Vanna White brought both a right of publicity 
claim and a claim under the Lanham Act for false endorsement of the 
defendant’s product when the defendant used a robot dressed as Ms. 
White in front of a mock Wheel of Fortune set.240 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act241 is especially relevant to 
right of publicity claims as celebrities often bring claims under this 
section as well as right of publicity claims.242 This section protects 
against false or misleading advertisements, which can occur when a 
celebrity’s likeness is used without authorization in conjunction with 
advertising the defendant’s product.243 Right of publicity laws and the 
Lanham Act share a common goal designed to protect the public 
from confusing similar trademarks and preventing dilution of 
celebrity brands.244 While the Lanham Act protects against unfair 
competition based on false advertising or misappropriation, many 
right of publicity laws seek to protect from the same type of harm.245 
                                                                                                       
recover damages where the contested depiction falsely implies an affiliation or 
endorsement by the personality of the goods or services promoted in connection 
with the misappropriated persona.”). 
 240. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 90-55840, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 19253, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992). 
 241. Also known as the Trademark Act of 1946, codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1051-1127 (2006).  
 242. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2811; accord White, 1992 U.S. App. 
19253, at *3 (bringing both a right of publicity cause of action and a cause of action 
under the Lanham Act). 
 243. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). In relevant part, this section states: 
(a) Civil action. 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which– 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is 
or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
Id. 
 244. See Lynne M. J. Boisineau, Intellectual Property Law: The Right of 
Publicity and Social Media Revolution, 30 GPSOLO 66, 66 (2013). 
 245. See id. (“The Lanham Act also contains provisions for redressing unfair 
competition based on false advertising, misappropriation, or passing off.”). 
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A celebrity’s name or likeness can be considered his or her “brand” 
or trademark that can be diluted or misappropriated if used without 
that celebrity’s consent.246 Both sets of laws are designed to allow 
celebrities to control the use of their image in a commercial way.247 
The Lanham Act, however, only addresses false endorsements of 
celebrity personas, not general unauthorized uses of likenesses, and it 
does not face the preemption challenges the right of publicity 
faces.248 
IV. MAKING ROOM FOR BOTH THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
The issue of a person or company using one’s image can have 
lasting effects on the person whose image was used and the holder of 
the copyrighted image.249 Both parties should be allowed to enforce 
their right to protect either themselves or their creative property.250 
This person whose name or likeness was used without consent 
should have a mechanism for protecting the pecuniary interest that 
he or she has already developed, is developing, or generally protect 
his or her name or likeness if he or she does not want to develop a 
pecuniary interest.251 Since the image is being used for profit, as 
                                                 
 246. See id. (explaining a name, likeness, or voice of a celebrity may become 
so well-known as to become a “brand” that he or she can commercially exploit and 
would therefore want to control). 
 247. See id. (“Notwithstanding these similarities, right-of-publicity law also 
remains the most fluid and erratic area of protection, in part because not all states 
have enacted laws specifically protecting the right of publicity. To complicate 
matters further, the right of publicity has been evolving as technology does.”).  
 248. See id. at 67 (“The state-to-state differences in the treatment of right-of-
publicity claims may lead to different outcomes.”). Because the right of publicity is 
state law, compared to the Lanham Act, which is federal law, there are also unique 
issues of preemption by federal law. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2812 
(explaining that right of publicity causes of action arise under “preemptable state 
law”). 
 249. See Dewey, supra note 21 (discussing both the issues of right of 
publicity and copyright infringement issues stemming from the Chris Baldwin “Sad 
Michigan Fan” situation).  
 250. See id. (explaining that the person who has his or her image used for 
profit without consent should be able to protect the image from being used, and the 
party that uses the image also faces potential copyright infringement liability from 
the broadcaster or owner of the image). 
 251. See id. (“Just the fact that somebody thinks they can make money on 
your likeness is enough to establish that you probably have a pecuniary interest in 
your name or likeness, because if someone else can make money on it then, in 
theory, you could, too.”). Dewey specifically discusses the case of Chris Baldwin 
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compared to news or commentary, the unauthorized commercial use 
is not protected under the First Amendment if it is not 
transformative.252 At the same time, the owner of the copyrighted 
work should be allowed to protect its creative work from copyright 
infringement but may face the challenge of overcoming the fair use 
defense.253 
A. The Effect on the Ordinary Person’s Right of Publicity 
At their current stage and with their lack of uniformity, it is 
unclear whether the right of publicity laws protect the ordinary 
person or only celebrities.254 The right of the person attempting to 
protect his or her likeness will depend on the jurisdiction in which 
that person is trying to bring a cause of action.255 Chris Baldwin, the 
“Sad Michigan Fan,” would likely have a cause of action in 
Michigan because a company was using his likeness for a 
commercial purpose.256 Though the case of the “Sad Michigan Fan” 
                                                                                                       
and his image as it was used by an Ohio T-shirt company, which is the main topic of 
this Comment. Id.; see also supra INTRODUCTION. 
 252. See Dewey, supra note 21 (“[H]e [wa]s just a college kid who did not 
have a pecuniary right in his name or likeness, but now his likeness is being used for 
a commercial purpose. Somebody is profiting off of that, so . . . there would be some 
right to publicity concerns there for him.”).  
 253. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 142, at 1053 (“The fair use 
defense to copyright infringement is perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated 
defense in the law of intellectual property.”). 
 254. See Dewey, supra note 21. In Michigan, it is unclear based on the case 
law whether one has to be a celebrity to have a right of publicity cause of action or 
simply have a pecuniary interest in your name or likeness. Id. See also supra Section 
I.B (discussing various right of publicity laws in other jurisdictions). Because right 
of publicity is governed by state law, whether someone has a cause of action 
depends on the jurisdiction. Id. But see Hoisington, supra note 18 (“Technically, 
everyone enjoys a right of publicity. . . . If you are famous—even if it’s just for 15 
minutes—you definitely do.”). 
 255. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (discussing differing state right 
of publicity laws); see also supra Section I.B (discussing details of right of publicity 
statutes and common law in various jurisdictions). 
 256. See Dewey, supra note 21 (“That’s because in Michigan there is a body 
of law related to publicity that indicates an individual who has some pecuniary right 
in his or her name or likeness, whose name or likeness has been used for the 
commercial benefit of someone else without his or her permission, would have 
cause of action for right to publicity. . . . ‘Some cases have indicated that having 
some name recognition or some level of celebrity is important to making that claim, 
but other cases have indicated that you don’t necessarily have to be a celebrity.’”). 
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occurred at a sporting event, the age of the Internet and instant 
communication could mean others could face a similar problem.257 
1. The “Bad Luck Brian” Meme 
Kyle Craven, the person in the “Bad Luck Brian” memes, took 
a bad school picture his junior year of high school.258 The first meme 
was posted online by Craven’s friend as a joke, and for reasons 
unknown, the image became viral.259 In his case, companies followed 
what should be the required procedure and approached Craven for 
licensing and T-shirt deals.260 While not every situation would end 
this way, Craven earned approximately $15,000–$20,000 within 
three years by giving companies permission to use his image in 
relation to their products.261 
                                                 
 257. See David Franklyn & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself in a World of 
Others: Towards a Paid-For First Amendment, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 977, 994-
95 (2014) (“The Internet breaks down borders and allows participation and 
interaction (and infringement) on a massive scale. YouTube users watch over six 
billion hours of footage each month. Beyond that, high-traffic social websites such 
as Facebook, Twitter, reddit, imgur, and tumblr allow users to post, discuss, and 
create content individually or collaboratively. Modern participatory culture is 
anchored on the Internet where content can be created, uploaded, shared, and 
remixed at the push of a button. Many content trends involve ‘memes,’ which pose 
innovative intellectual property problems. Generally, memes are messages conveyed 
in the form of a picture transposed with captions. A type of visual communication, 
the image as a whole oftentimes has a satirical meaning that its component parts 
lack.”). 
 258. See Jessica Contrera, Being Bad Luck Brian: When the Meme that Made 
You Famous Starts to Fade Away, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/being-bad-luck-brian-when-the-
meme-that-made-you-famous-starts-to-fade-away/2015/01/05/07cbf6ac-907c-11e4-
a412-4b735edc7175_story.html [https://perma.cc/68SH-WSBR] The image is 
described as: 
[A] blond kid wearing a light blue polo shirt under a hideous red sweater 
vest, giving off the goofiest, braces-laced smile. Above and below his head 
are the large white block letters that turn the silly photo into a meme—a 
sort of one panel cartoon in which the caption is rewritten over and over. 
Id.  
 259. See id. (noting that Craven’s friend who posted the picture on Reddit 
informed Craven he was now “Internet-famous”). 
 260. See id. (“He has been asked to let people use his picture for 
advertisements in Germany, Chile, Poland and Puerto Rico. Here, he has been part 
of ad campaigns for Volkswagen and RealPlayer. He negotiates all the deals 
himself.”). 
 261. See id. 
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2. The “Ain’t Nobody Got Time for That” Meme 
In a situation more similar to Chris Baldwin, Kimberly Wilkins 
was interviewed for the local news station and informed the news 
that she fled from a burning building because she had bronchitis and 
“ain’t nobody got time for that.”262 The video went viral.263 As a 
result, Wilkins filed a lawsuit against Apple after it began selling the 
song “I Got Bronchitis,” which was produced on the Bob Rivers 
Show and subsequently sold on iTunes, using samples from 
Wilkins’s interview without permission.264 Apple has since removed 
the song from iTunes.265 
3. The “Scumbag Steve” Meme 
The danger of unlimited use of someone’s image is not only 
about monetary damages; it can have negative effects on the person’s 
reputation.266 The image of Blake Boston, taken by his mom and 
posted to MySpace, was copied and used exclusively for negative 
                                                 
 262. See Megan Rose Dickey, ‘Ain’t Nobody Got Time for That’ Viral-Video 
Star Does Have Time to Sue Apple, BUS. INSIDER, Mar. 12, 2013, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/sweet-brown-apple-lawsuit-2013-3 [https:// 
perma.cc/RJ2M-LUGX].  
 263. See id. (noting the video became a viral sensation, gaining one million 
views on YouTube within the first forty-eight hours).  
 264. See id. (“The Bob Rivers Show, according to Sweet Brown’s complaint, 
produced the song with samples from Wilkins’ interview with the local TV-news 
station. The song sampled phrases like, ‘Ain’t nobody got time for that,’ ‘Ran for 
my life,’ and ‘Oh, Lord Jesus it’s a fire.’ The suit claims that in April 2012, the 
defendants started selling the song on iTunes for profit. It also claims the radio 
program and its owner falsely advertised that Sweet Brown had given her consent 
for the radio station to use her voice and likeness in the song.”). 
 265. See id. (“The Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides protection for 
companies if they promptly take action to remove material whose copyright is 
disputed. Apple has since removed the song from iTunes.”). However, the claim 
may not actually hold up in court because Apple removed the song from iTunes. Id.  
 266. See Adonis Jones, Non-Celebrities and Non-Athletes in Meme Culture, 
MEMES IN MEDIA, CULTURE, & SOC’Y, http://scalar.usc.edu/works/memes-1/non-
celebrities-and-common-people-in-meme-culture.meta [https://perma.cc/YUZ7-
G75C] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“That context is removed when dealing with non-
celebrity memes, and all that remains is the image for the meme creator and the 
reader to creator [sic] their own context. . . . However, when a meme is created, all 
that the writer of the meme has to work with is the image and the text they choose to 
add.”). Along with the power to create what the meme represents, the creator can 
create a positive or negative message, which can severely affect the person who is 
the subject of the meme. Id.   
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memes.267 The creation of this meme led to the family being 
harassed, and despite efforts to contact Google to have the image 
removed, there was no remedy to protect Boston’s image.268 Not only 
did Boston and his family fail to receive compensation for the use of 
his image, he and his family were subject to harassment on the 
Internet with no way to stop the use of the image.269 
4. “Bye Ayesha” T-Shirt 
A scenario involving another Ohio T-shirt company that may 
bring to light a potential lawsuit in the future is the creation of a 
“Bye Ayesha” T-shirt, referencing Ayesha Curry’s tweets about the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) finals.270 The T-shirt 
references the movie Friday271 as well as Curry’s Twitter rant 
regarding the NBA finals being rigged against her husband.272 While 
                                                 
 267. See id. (“Unlike many other memes where the subject is seen as positive 
or neutral, Scumbag Steve is the punching bag of the meme world, being used as the 
subject of all meme creators’ hatred and loathing.”). 
 268. See id. (explaining that the harassment included death threats to Blake 
Boston’s unborn child as people could not separate him from “Scumbag Steve”). 
 269. See id. (describing how the image, which started as something Blake 
Boston’s mother posted to her own MySpace account, the family members now felt 
like they could not control the image of their family). 
 270. See Ryan Glasspiegel, Cavs Fans Apparently Purchasing “Bye Ayesha” 
Shirts in Droves, BIG LEAD (June 20, 2016, 1:15 PM), http://thebiglead.com/2016/ 
06/20/cavs-fans-apparently-purchasing-bye-ayesha-shirts-in-droves [https:// 
perma.cc/6MB7-XJK8]. There were two instances within the same NBA series in 
which Ayesha Curry’s tweets garnered significant attention. Id. Having been put in 
the spotlight as the wife of one of the most prominent players on one of the teams in 
the series, Stephan Curry of the Golden State Warriors, and her negative tweets 
about the series, her social media presence captured attention that led to the creation 
of this shirt. Id.  
 271. Id. (including the clip from Friday which the phrase “Bye Ayesha” 
references).  
 272. See Bay Area News Group, “Bye Ayesha” T-shirts Are Hot Sellers in 
Cleveland, EAST BAY TIMES (June 20, 2016), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2016/ 
06/20/bye-ayesha-T-shirts-are-hot-sellers-in-cleveland/ [https://perma.cc/6A39-
FSXF] (“The line [on the shirt] is co-inspired by a line from the movie ‘Friday’ 
starring Ice Cube and the fact that Ayesha Curry had used it with a hashtag in a 
Twitter post during a series of tweets regarding the Warriors in the NBA Finals 
against the Cleveland Cavaliers. In one tweet, which was later deleted, Ayesha 
Curry wondered [sic] finals had been ‘rigged’ after her husband fouled out and then 
was ejected from a Game 6 loss in Cleveland for throwing his mouthpiece.”); see 
also Frank Isola, Ayesha Curry Goes Off on Twitter, Says NBA Is Rigged, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (June 17, 2016, 9:51 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/ 
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this T-shirt does not utilize Curry’s image the way an Internet meme 
would, it does use her name for a commercial purpose.273 The 
Cleveland based T-shirt company sold approximately 1,000 shirts the 
night of the final game of the series.274 It is highly unlikely that this 
company asked permission to use Curry’s name, as the owner of the 
company admits that the idea came to him and within thirty minutes 
the shirts were made.275 
The ability of people today to have instant communication at 
their fingertips has led to the problem of overnight Internet 
celebrities for both good and bad reasons.276 Currently, some of these 
“celebrities” may have a cause of action to protect the use of their 
image for commercial purposes, but others do not due to the 
patchwork of state laws.277 This situation is not only confined to 
copyright and right of publicity, but similar situations have been seen 
in the commercial use of trademarks without permission.278 
                                                                                                       
basketball/ayesha-curry-complains-cavs-wouldn-warriors-family-arena-article-
1.2677030 [https://perma.cc/75UZ-UBVR] (showing several of Ayesha Curry’s 
tweets regarding the NBA).  
 273. See Glasspiegel, supra note 270 (including an image of the “Bye 
Ayesha” T-shirt). 
 274. See Bay Area News Group, supra note 272 (explaining that the number 
of shirts sold is likely due to the fact that the Cleveland Cavaliers had defeated the 
Golden State Warriors, the team Ayesha Curry’s husband played for). 
 275. See Glasspiegel, supra note 270 (explaining the first company to sell 
these shirts, Lamp Apparel, is a local company, and so it is highly unlikely that it 
could have contacted someone like Ayesha Curry and gotten permission so quickly); 
see also Bay Area News Group, supra note 272 (“‘[The idea] came out of nowhere 
and we whipped them up in 30 minutes,’ owner Brandon Lamp told TMZ. ‘Once 
Cleveland won, it went crazy. The orders have been non-stop.’”). 
 276. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 277. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (“Moreover, it is far from clear 
whether, as a normative question, the law should be providing greater incentives for 
people to pursue celebrity. When the throngs of American Idol and reality television 
hopefuls are considered alongside the United States’ ongoing need to import skilled 
technical workers from abroad, concerns for economic incentives and efficient 
allocation of resources may weigh against recognizing a right of publicity at all.”). 
 278. See Daily Mail Reporter, Fear the Brow! Top NBA Prospect Copyrights 
His UNIBROW Just Days Before the Draft, DAILY MAIL (June 26, 2012, 4:24 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2165129/Top-NBA-prospect-Anthony-
Davis-copyrights-unibrows-just-days-draft.html [https://perma.cc/J9R9- 
ZJEJ]. Anthony Davis, a top NBA prospect, was well-known for his prominent 
unibrow. Id. He explained that he did not “want anyone to try to grow a unibrow 
because of [him] and then try to make money off it.” Id. See also Hostin, supra note 
55. Robert Burck, also known as the Naked Cowboy, plays his guitar in Time 
Square, New York City in cowboy boots and underwear. Id. Burck sued Mars for $6 
million for violation of his trademark and right of publicity when Mars created an ad 
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B. The Effect on the Owner of the Copyrighted Image and Broadcast 
While the person in the copyrighted work may or may not have 
a cause of action to protect his or her image, the owner of the 
copyright will have a cause of action to protect the creative 
property.279 Copyrights have long been held to belong to the author of 
a creative work, such as the author of a book or the person taking a 
photograph.280 In the case of Chris Baldwin and his “Sad Michigan 
Fan” facial expression, the copyright belongs to the company that 
broadcasts the game, which was ESPN.281 In this instance, pursuant 
to the terms and conditions on the back of its football ticket, the 
University of Michigan owned a copyright of the ticket buyer’s 
image, likeness, actions, or statement through its own recordings.282 
The T-shirt company in this case, Cincy Shirts, could have been 
liable to both ESPN and the University of Michigan for using the 
copyrighted image without permission.283 Chris Baldwin should be 
allowed to bring a right of publicity claim to protect his image in 
conjunction with the University of Michigan and ESPN bringing 
copyright infringement cases to protect the copyrights in the 
broadcast and images of the game.284 
Similar to the University of Michigan, many sporting event 
locations have policies that the team or overarching organization 
holds the copyright to any footage or images taken from within the 
                                                                                                       
with M&M characters walking around what appears to be Time Square in what 
appears to be the Naked Cowboy’s outfit. Id. 
 279. See Dewey, supra note 21. For example, this has been an issue 
previously with the NFL and the sports commentary company SB Nation. Id. SB 
Nation was using Twitter for circulating GIFs that were the sole copyright of the 
NFL. Id. The NFL sent Twitter Digital Millennium Copyright ACT (DMCA) take 
down notices. Id. This, however, caused negative backlash, as SB Nation is typically 
considered a news outlet, and news generally qualifies for fair use protection under 
the Copyright Act. Id. 
 280. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 
(1884) (“An author in that sense is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; 
maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.’”). 
 281. See Austin, supra note 24 (showing that the University of Michigan 
versus Michigan State football game was broadcast on ESPN and its online mobile 
application, WatchESPN).  
 282. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 283. See Dewey, supra note 21 (explaining the alleged infringer could be 
liable to the copyright owner and the broadcaster). In the case of Chris Baldwin, the 
owners of the image were the University of Michigan and ESPN. See Austin, supra 
note 24; Michigan State v. Michigan Football Ticket, supra note 30. 
 284. See Dewey, supra note 21 (discussing both Chris Baldwin’s cause of 
action and possible copyright infringement). 
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stadium.285 The University of Michigan contains a clause within the 
terms and conditions on the back of its football tickets stating that it 
owns an unrestricted right to the ticket holder’s image, likeness, 
actions, and statements.286 In comparison, Michigan State University 
football tickets contain no such language in the terms and 
conditions.287 This means that Chris Baldwin would not be able to 
sue the University of Michigan for using his image, but he could 
have sued Michigan State if this game had been played at Michigan 
State and the cameraman caught his reaction.288 Comparing the 
University of Michigan and Michigan State tickets to other sports 
teams within Michigan, the Detroit Tigers and Lansing Lugnuts, both 
professional baseball teams, sell tickets with terms and conditions on 
the back that allow the team to use the image of the ticket holder 
with no restrictions.289 The right of someone like Chris Baldwin 
being caught on camera should be the same no matter what 
jurisdiction the event occurs in or what event the person is attending, 
leading to the need for uniform protection that is not preempted. 
C. Solution: A Federal Right of Publicity Statute that Coexists with 
Copyright Protections  
Both the person who has his or her image used without his or 
her permission and the owner of the copyright should be able to 
                                                 
 285. See Johnson, supra note 136, at 765-66. (noting this is especially true 
for the NFL to own the copyrights from its games and events). For example, the 
NFL claims it owns the copyright to any footage shot within the stadium no matter 
who shoots this footage, including fans and media members. Id. at 766. See also 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845-47 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that NBA games are not copyrightable, but the broadcasts are since they are 
the games fixed in a tangible medium).  
 286. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Purdue v. Michigan State University, Michigan State University 
Football Ticket (Oct. 3, 2015) (on file with author).  
 288. Compare supra note 30 and accompanying text, with source cited supra 
note 287. 
 289. See Red Sox v. Tigers, Detroit Tigers Baseball Ticket (Aug. 20, 2016) 
(on file with author) (“By use of this ticket, the ticketholder agrees . . . (c) the Club, 
Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. and Major League Baseball Enterprises, Inc. 
shall have the unrestricted right and license to use his or her likeness as included in 
any broadcast, telecast or photograph taken in connection with the game.”); Lake 
County Captains v. Lansing Lugnuts, Lansing Lugnuts Baseball Ticket (Apr. 24, 
2016) (on file with author) (“Holder allows participating clubs and their designees to 
use holder’s image or likeness in connection with any broadcast or reproduction of 
this game.”). 
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protect their interests against impermissible commercial use.290 There 
should be a federal right of publicity statute that allows for 
uniformity in who and what is protected that is not preempted by 
copyright law.291 Similar to the Shamsky decision, the marketability 
and protection of one’s name and likeness, especially from a specific 
event or occurrence, should be differentiated from the marketability 
and protection of the copyrighted image.292 Under that legal scheme, 
anyone whose image or likeness is used, whether taken from a 
broadcast, uploaded Internet picture, or social media, would have a 
cause of action against any company that used the image or likeness 
for profit without obtaining permission.293 However, this right should 
not be extended to allow causes of action against the owner of the 
copyrighted image.294 The federal right of publicity statute should 
mirror that of the Lanham Act, which is the most analogous federal 
law.295 The Lanham Act currently supplements state right of publicity 
laws and allows a celebrity whose depiction has been used without 
consent to endorse a product to collect damages.296 A statute should 
be enacted to replace state right of publicity laws with a federal 
                                                 
 290. See Dewey, supra note 21 (explaining both the right of publicity and 
copyright infringement causes of action).  
 291. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 17 (“On that basis, § 301(a) of the 
Copyright Act expressly preempts state law claims that fall within the general 
subject matter of copyright law and seek redress of rights equivalent to the exclusive 
rights in § 106 of the Copyright Act. A federal right of publicity statute should 
preempt state law in the same way.”). 
 292. See 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 937 (1995) (distinguishing between marketable 
status of the personality and the image). 
 293. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 17 (suggesting a federal right of 
publicity statute that covers “names and likenesses and not apply to news, 
commentary, expressive works, or advertising attendant to such works”). 
 294. See Michigan State v. Michigan Football Ticket, supra note 30. 
 295. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (“The closest federal analogue to 
the right of publicity is a Lanham Act claim for false endorsement. However, 
although the right of publicity and the Lanham Act apply to some of the same 
situations, they are far from identical. In general, the right of publicity is 
significantly broader than the Lanham Act and applies to many situations in which 
the Lanham Act does not. For example, the Lanham Act requires that there be some 
element of falsity, deception, or confusion as to whether the plaintiff is endorsing or 
associated with the defendant’s product, but no such requirement exists for the right 
of publicity.”).  
 296. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2811 (“Under the Lanham Act, a 
personality whose depiction has been used without permission may recover damages 
where the contested depiction falsely implies an affiliation or endorsement by the 
personality of the goods or services promoted in connection with the 
misappropriated persona.”). 
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statute that works with the Lanham Act to protect anyone’s image 
from being misappropriated for profit.297 Thus, instead of the Lanham 
Act supplementing state right of publicity laws, the new federal 
statute and Lanham Act would work together to protect a broader 
scope of issues.298 
This new federal right of publicity statute would not affect the 
copyright protections on the image or the ability for copyright 
holders to sue for infringement.299 Additionally, for ticketed events, 
the tickets should contain language that allows the organization 
sponsoring the event to have the unconditional right to use the ticket 
holder’s image from that event taken by the organization’s own 
photographers, videographers, and reporters.300 This prevents 
unnecessary litigation when the owner of the copyrighted image has 
lawfully used its own image without obtaining permission from the 
person within the image.301 There should be a federal right of 
publicity statute that allows for a person to protect his or her likeness 
that can coexist with federal copyright laws to protect both the 
person’s interest and the copyright holder’s interest.302 
                                                 
 297. See id.; see also Boisineau, supra note 244, at 66 (explaining that the 
right of publicity and the Lanham Act have the same goal). 
 298. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2811 (“A complementary area of 
federal law, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, supplements state-law publicity 
rights.”); see also Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15 (“In general, the right of 
publicity is significantly broader than the Lanham Act and applies to many 
situations in which the Lanham Act does not.”). 
 299. See Toney v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that a person’s likeness does not meet the criteria to be copyrighted and 
that does not change simply because that likeness is captured in a copyrightable 
photograph); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that 
misappropriation claims do not fall within the subject matter of copyright nor 
conflict with the purposes of the Copyright Act). 
 300. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. This language applies to 
stills, broadcasts, and audio that would come out of the event taken by employees or 
contractors of the organization. See id. This right would not extend to images taken 
by fans themselves, as the University of Michigan would no longer be the author of 
those photographs. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-
58 (1884) (explaining who the author of a creative work is). 
 301. See Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that right of publicity is not preempted because a person’s name and 
likeness is separate and different than the copyrighted image). It is notable that if the 
person in the image gives permission, either through express consent or through a 
clause on a purchased ticket, then there could then be a cause of action for both right 
of publicity and copyright infringement, but the person in the image could not sue 
the copyright owner. See id.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 302. See Dewey, supra note 21 (noting that in the case of Chris Baldwin, the 
owner of the copyright may have a cause of action in copyright infringement). 
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D. Counterarguments: Protecting Monopolies on the Ordinary 
Person’s Image and Overprotecting Copyrights Hinders Free 
Speech 
The expansion of the right of publicity and copyright protection 
will be faced with resistance due to First Amendment limitations and 
general opposition to expanding these protections.303 One argument 
against a federal right of publicity is that an ordinary person does not 
have the right to protect the use of his or her image because he or she 
cannot allege any monetary harm.304 Aside from allegations of 
damages, there is the argument that this protection of one’s likeness 
chills speech, but uses protected by the First Amendment can be 
differentiated using the transformativeness test.305 Similarly, there is 
the concern that protecting copyrights too heavily hinders the 
dissemination of information, but this too can be countered through 
the fair use doctrine.306 
1. The Ordinary Person Caught on Camera Is Not Famous and 
Should Not Have a Right of Publicity 
Perhaps the ordinary person should not be allowed to have a 
cause of action to protect his or her right of publicity because the 
ordinary person has no pecuniary interest in his or her name or 
                                                 
 303. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Dewey, supra note 
21 (explaining that, at least in Michigan, the right of publicity protection may only 
extend to certain people).  
 304. See Dewey, supra note 21 (explaining that most people do not have a 
pecuniary interest in their name; however, there may be pecuniary interests that start 
because some other person or entity is now making a profit off the person’s name 
and likeness). 
 305. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 103 (“The transformative use test 
in particular has risen to prominence in a number of jurisdictions.”). The 
transformative tests are the ones the courts have been relying on most recently and 
are the ones considered in this Comment. See id. The transformative use test is 
distinguishable from the transformative prong of the copyright fair use test because 
it is the alteration of the likeness of the person in the image, and not the 
transformativeness of the broadcast as a whole, which falls more under the 
transformative work test. Id.  
 306. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 142, at 1053 (“While fair 
use appears as the first in a series of defenses and mandatory licenses in the 
Copyright Act of 1976, it is seen as much more than that. Fair use is a keystone of 
the law of copyright; the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that fair use is a 
constitutionally mandated limitation on copyright in order to avoid conflicts between 
the First Amendment’s free speech protections and the monopoly rights copyright 
owners receive over expressions.”). 
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likeness and therefore cannot claim any damage or harm done.307 For 
example, in California, the statutory right of publicity contains a 
specific element in which a plaintiff needs to establish an injury.308 
To recover monetary damages, a plaintiff would need to allege some 
sort of economic damage, such as the amount that would have 
needed to be paid to the plaintiff for him or her to agree to the picture 
or loss of value in the plaintiff’s identity.309 The issue with this is that 
it may be difficult for an ordinary person, such as a college student, 
to allege any pecuniary interest in his image that would result in 
damages the court could award.310  
This outcome may not be the result in Michigan, though, as the 
common law rule does not include a similar damages requirement.311 
It can also be argued that Chris Baldwin, the “Sad Michigan Fan,” 
does have a pecuniary interest in his name, at least to the point of 
preventing others from profiting from it.312 In fact, based on his 
image circulating on the Internet, Chris Baldwin is still treated like a 
local celebrity around the University of Michigan campus.313 He was 
also asked to attend ESPN’s College Football Awards Show to 
                                                 
 307. See Dewey, supra note 21 (noting that most ordinary people do not 
have any sort of economic interest in their name or likeness). 
 308. See Sager, supra note 52, at 1 n.4 (listing “(3) resulting injury” as an 
element of a right of publicity claim).  
 309. See, e.g., Marr, supra note 20, at 873 (“To recover monetary damages, 
however, a plaintiff must establish and quantify the economic damage from the use. 
If, for example, the defendant used the plaintiff’s image without permission in an 
advertisement, one measure of damages would be what the defendant would likely 
have had to pay to entice the plaintiff (or someone whose identity had similar 
commercial value) to appear in the advertisement. Another possible measure of 
damages is the resultant loss of economic value of the plaintiff’s identity. This could 
occur, for example, if the complained-of use resulted in a reduced demand for 
plaintiff’s services.”). 
 310. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.  
 312. See supra note 256 (suggesting that due to the fact that some person or 
company is now profiting off the image of Chris Baldwin, there is an argument that 
he has the pecuniary interest in his image because he could have made a shirt and 
profited off his image). 
 313. See Zac Al-Khateeb, Stunned Michigan Fan Chris Baldwin Can’t Get 
Away from His Moment of Fame, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 31, 2016, 
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/news/stunned-michigan-fan-chris-
baldwin-michigan-state-game-finish-fumbled-punt-wolverines-
spartans/u3dd3o1gt5eb1fhur75a4pfzw [https://perma.cc/2UUV-87YD] (describing 
how in August of the year following the game, Chris Baldwin was still being 
stopped by people on the street who recognize him and has become an on-campus 
celebrity). 
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present the award for “best play of the season” to Michigan State 
University’s football coach, Mark Dantonio.314 Ultimately, the T-shirt 
company sent Chris Baldwin a check, Ohio food favorites, and 
donated to the ChadTough Foundation in Baldwin’s name, all of 
which suggest that there was a pecuniary interest in Baldwin’s image 
that could be protected.315 There should still be a requirement for the 
person to show that he or she has a pecuniary interest in his or her 
likeness, but this will likely always be met by virtue of a company 
using the likeness for profit or another commercial purpose.316 If this 
person does have protection, there is then the issue of balancing that 
protection with the First Amendment.317 
2. Protecting Images Through Right of Publicity Laws Hinders 
Free Speech Under the First Amendment 
In general, the right of publicity does not extend to using 
someone’s identity for news reporting or commentary, which are 
protected uses under the First Amendment.318 By allowing Chris 
Baldwin to prevent his image from being used, it could be 
considered chilling speech in regards to the specific football game.319 
Currently, the most prominent test that courts use to determine if the 
                                                 
 314. See Tower, supra note 16 (“[W]ho better to present the award to MSU 
Coach Mark Dantonio than the student who became the face of the Wolverines’ loss. 
Then became a local celebrity. And then became an internet meme.”). 
 315. See Goldschmidt, supra note 11 (noting Chris Baldwin was sent a check 
of an undisclosed amount of money; sent local food favorites such as Skyline Chili, 
Montgomery Inn ribs, and Graters ice cream; and a $500 donation was made in his 
name to the foundation established in honor of Chad Carr, the grandson of former 
Michigan coach Lloyd Carr). 
 316. See Dewey, supra note 21 (“Just the fact that somebody thinks they can 
make money on your likeness is enough to establish that you probably have a 
pecuniary interest in your name or likeness, because if someone else can make 
money on it then, in theory, you could, too.”). 
 317. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 318. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 28, at 206-07 (“In theory, at least, the 
right of publicity does not extend to the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, 
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or advertising for these 
works.”). 
 319. See Weisbord, supra note 35, at 2812 (“On the other hand, publicity 
rights operate by granting the owner exclusionary rights, thus allowing the 
personality to enjoin or charge for use of her persona. Exclusionary rights may be 
waived or not asserted, so the right of publicity operates by allowing the right holder 
to decide whether to permit the use of her persona. The very existence of publicity 
rights, therefore, tends to chill speech about the personality because the right creates 
at least the threat of possible liability for use of the persona.”). 
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use of a person’s name or likeness is protected under the First 
Amendment is the “transformative use” test.320 The transformative 
use test321 focuses on whether the image of the person itself has been 
transformed rather than focusing on the work as a whole.322 Thus, the 
original image of Chris Baldwin would need to be compared to the 
image of him on the T-shirt sold by Cincy Shirts.323 Both the original 
picture and the image on the T-shirt portray a young man with short 
hair and glasses wearing a hooded “Michigan” sweatshirt with pull 
strings in the front.324 The young man in both pictures looks shocked 
and has his hands on his head at relatively the same angle, covering 
the same portions of his hair and face.325 The only difference is the 
man on the T-shirt is slightly less realistic looking and is solely 
colored in white and red.326  
This situation is distinguishable from Winter, where the 
depictions of Johnny and Edgar Winter were creative because they 
were not literal depictions of the brothers, but creative expressions of 
the brothers with worm bodies.327 Though it was obvious the 
drawings were of the Winter brothers, the rendition was creative 
                                                 
 320. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 103 (“The transformative use test 
in particular has risen to prominence in a number of jurisdictions, though this test 
significantly cramps expression and has led to some questionable results.”). 
 321. This test was chosen for this Comment over the other tests explored in 
Subsections I.C.1-2, supra, because of its prominence. See id. Additionally, the 
newsworthiness test is difficult to apply based on its wide array of definitions, and 
the other tests (the CBC test, core speech test, and predominant use test) are almost 
never used. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
 322. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 102 (explaining “the 
‘transformative use’ test, asks whether the celebrity’s likeness itself has been 
distorted or altered; if it has not, the right of publicity claim may proceed”). This is 
differentiated from the copyright transformative fair use analysis used in Subsection 
IV.D.3, infra, which focuses on the transformation of the entire work through a new 
meaning or message in a parody and not the person’s image within the work. See 
Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 789 (explaining copyright’s transformative 
analysis is used for works when “those uses [in the second work] serve an entirely 
new purpose from the original”). 
 323. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 103 (focusing on the distortion and 
alteration of the likeness itself).  
 324. Compare Tower, supra note 16 (image of Chris Baldwin), with 
Goldschmidt, supra note 11 (image of the shirt with Chris Baldwin’s image). See 
also supra INTRODUCTION. 
 325. Compare Tower, supra note 16, with Goldschmidt, supra note 11. 
 326. See Goldschmidt, supra note 11 (image of the shirt with Chris 
Baldwin’s image).  
 327. 69 P.3d 473, 478-79 (Cal. 2003) (holding that creative expression was 
protected under the First Amendment). 
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enough to be transformative.328 In fact, this case more similarly aligns 
with Comedy III, where The Three Stooges were portrayed in a way 
that was not creative and was essentially a depiction of what brought 
economic value to the characters.329 In the case of Chris Baldwin, 
Cincy Shirts merely created a more cartoon-like version of Baldwin 
by depicting him in Ohio State University colors, but it did little else 
to transform Baldwin’s image.330 Without any significant alteration 
or distinction to Chris Baldwin’s image, his right of publicity claim 
would likely be able to proceed past the First Amendment defense.331  
Even if a court were to use the transformative work test instead, 
Chris Baldwin’s right of publicity claim would survive the defense.332 
Baldwin’s image is not part of a much broader work as required by 
this test to defeat a right of publicity cause of action.333 His image is 
the focal point on the shirt that merely says “OHIO,” in which his 
image is the first “O.”334 The makers of this shirt did not use 
Baldwin’s image to create a much larger work, thus transforming the 
use of his likeness, but instead made his shocked reaction the reason 
to purchase the shirt, thus overcoming the transformative work 
defense.335 Under both the transformative work and transformative 
                                                 
 328. Id. (determining that the defendants only used the plaintiffs’ likenesses 
as raw materials for a creative work). 
 329. 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the work was not protected 
under the First Amendment because it was not transformative). 
 330. Compare Tower, supra note 16 (image of Chris Baldwin), with 
Goldschmidt, supra note 11 (image of the shirt with Chris Baldwin’s image). See 
also supra INTRODUCTION. 
 331. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 102-03 (explaining that under the 
transformative use test, the question is whether “the celebrity’s likeness itself has 
been distorted or altered; if it has not, the right of publicity claim may proceed”). 
 332. See id. (explaining the transformative work test asks, “[W]hether a work 
uses the plaintiff’s likeness as merely one piece of a much broader work; if it does, 
the right of publicity claim must fail”). 
 333. See Goldschmidt, supra note 11 (image of the shirt with Chris 
Baldwin’s image). 
 334. See id. 
 335. See id.; see also Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 102 (explaining the 
requirements under the transformative work test). There could be an argument that 
Cincy Shirts transformed Baldwin’s image by depicting him in Ohio State colors 
and as part of the word “OHIO” to turn his reaction from an improbable play by 
Michigan State into always being shocked and embarrassed by Ohio State 
University. Compare Tower, supra note 16 (image of Chris Baldwin), with 
Goldschmidt, supra note 11 (image of the shirt with Chris Baldwin’s image). This 
argument is likely to be overcome, however, because there is insufficient 
transformation of the portrayal of Baldwin to meet the transformativeness test in 
right of publicity law. See id. 
 The “Sad Michigan Fan” 921 
use tests, Chris Baldwin would be able to overcome the First 
Amendment defenses to bring a right of publicity cause of action to 
protect the unauthorized use of his likeness for profit.336 This 
protection, however, does not affect the copyright holder’s 
infringement claim—that would have its own First Amendment 
defense to overcome.337 
3. The Protection of Images Through Copyright Law Hinders 
Free Speech Under the First Amendment 
There has also been tension between the protection of 
copyrighted works and free speech under the First Amendment.338 
However, a company such as Cincy Shirts that uses a copyrighted 
image without permission will be allowed to use the image if it 
amounts to fair use.339 The fair use test assumes some level of 
unauthorized use of copyrighted work in order to promote the goals 
of copyright law.340 Courts differ on which of the four prongs are 
most important in determining if there is fair use; however, it is 
likely that the transformative element would be a leading factor in 
                                                 
 336. See Stern & Stern, supra note 39, at 102-03 (explaining the 
transformative use and transformative work tests).  
 337. See Dewey, supra note 21 (discussing both the issues of right of 
publicity and copyright infringement issues stemming from the Chris Baldwin “Sad 
Michigan Fan” situation).  
 338. See Bauer, supra note 31, at 852. For example:  
[T]he Supreme Court [in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594] contrasted “mere 
duplication” of a work from a “transformative” use. Because duplication is 
far more likely to act as a substitute for the underlying work, thus 
diminishing the copyright owner’s monetary rewards, the defendant’s 
burden of prevailing on the [this] is much higher. . . . From a First 
Amendment perspective, however, the distinction often will point in the 
opposite direction. On occasion, a speaker or writer may find it necessary 
to use precisely the same expression as the copyrighted work; indeed, the 
value and strength of the communication would be undermined if she were 
required to make some transformation to invoke the benefits of the fair use 
doctrine. While the creation of derivative uses should be promoted, the 
fact that the activity is not transformative should not be a barrier to 
appropriate invocation of the First Amendment. 
Id. at 857. See also supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 339. See Bartholomew, supra note 102, at 789 (“Copyright’s transformation 
analysis [under fair use] has been used to immunize a broad array of unauthorized 
uses of copyrighted materials, particularly when those uses serve an entirely new 
purpose from the original.”). 
 340. See Elkin-Koren & Fischman-Afori, supra note 208, at 7 (“Fair use 
assumes that some level of unlicensed use is permissible under copyright law and 
necessary in order to promote copyright goals.”).  
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the case of the “Sad Michigan Fan.”341 Specifically, a parody may be 
fair use as it transforms the original image by commenting back on 
it.342 The leading definition of parody comes from the Supreme 
Court’s Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. decision, which suggests 
that the parody needs to critically comment on the original work.343 
In the case of the “Sad Michigan Fan” T-shirt, the print on the shirt 
comments on the long and bitter rivalry between the University of 
Michigan and Ohio State University.344 Thus, the comment that the 
University of Michigan will always be shocked and embarrassed by 
Ohio State University portrayed by Cincy Shirts using this image 
was to mock the rival, and this message would likely fall under the 
category of parody.345 The shirt, named “The Disappointment Up 
North,” also specifically references former Ohio State University 
                                                 
 341. See Jeffries & Goldman, supra note 214 (noting the Supreme Court has 
yet to determine which of the four factors of the fair use test is most important, 
despite lower courts producing inconsistent results by weighing the factors 
differently). This transformative analysis under copyright law differs from the 
transformative use analysis utilized in Subsection IV.D.2, supra, for right of 
publicity as the transformative use test focuses on the transformation of the person’s 
image and not the transformation of the overall work. See Stern & Stern, supra note 
39, at 102-03.  
 342. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-81 (1994) 
(“For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of any 
parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a 
prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on 
that author’s works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on 
the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer 
merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, 
the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it 
does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom 
larger. Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point.”). 
 343. See id. 
 344. See David Fitzgerald II, Why Ohio State vs. Michigan Is the Best 
Rivalry in College Football, BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 30, 2013), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1869320-why-ohio-state-vs-michigan-is-the-best-
rivalry-in-college-football [https://perma.cc/SMT3-RKCL]. The close geographic 
locations of the schools, the traditions for both the fans and football programs, and 
the big stakes that are usually on the line for both teams have led to a rivalry that has 
occurred 109 times. Id. The governor of Ohio even went as far to ban the letter “M” 
during the week of the game. Id.  
 345. See Kyle Newport, Ohio Shirt Company Creates Hilarious T-shirt 
Mocking Stunned Michigan Fan, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 19, 2015) 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2580643-ohio-shirt-company-creates-hilarious-T-
shirt-mocking-stunned-michigan-fan [https://perma.cc/ABX3-LALT]. 
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Coach Woody Hayes, who only referred to the University of 
Michigan as “That School Up North.”346  
The second fair use factor, nature of the copyrighted work, is 
rarely a significant factor in a finding for fair use.347 This is because 
copyright does not protect facts, but only the manner of expressing 
these facts.348 However, because there is less creativity in a factual 
work, such as the image of a fan at a football game, the work is 
afforded less protection, though it is still protected.349 
The third factor in the fair use doctrine is the consideration of 
the amount of the original work used.350 The implication is that the 
less of the original work that is used, the more likely a court will find 
for fair use.351 In the case of Chris Baldwin, the broadcast of the 
football game is approximately three and a half to four hours long.352 
The image of Baldwin that was taken from this broadcast was a 
                                                 
 346. See Fitzgerald, supra note 344 (“One of the most storied coaches in 
college football, Woody Hayes, refused to refer to Michigan by name, preferring the 
moniker ‘That School Up North.’”). The nickname Hayes gave to the University of 
Michigan is important because the shirt with Chris Baldwin’s image on it was called 
“The Disappointment Up North.” See Goldschmidt, supra note 11. 
 347. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 220 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“The second factor has rarely played a significant role in the determination of a fair 
use dispute. The Supreme Court in Harper & Row made a passing observation in 
dictum that, ‘[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual 
works than works of fiction or fantasy.’”) (citing WILLIAM F. PARTY, PARTY ON FAIR 
USE § 4.1 (2015); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
566 (1985)). 
 348. See id. (“[W]hile the copyright does not protect facts or ideas set forth 
in a work, it does protect that author’s manner of expressing those facts and ideas.”). 
 349. See id. (“The mere fact that the original is a factual work therefore 
should not imply that others may freely copy it. Those who report the news 
undoubtedly create factual works. It cannot seriously be argued that, for that reason, 
others my freely copy and re-disseminate news reports.”). 
 350. See id. at 221 (“The clear implication of the third factor is that a finding 
of fair use is more likely when small amounts, or less important passages, are copied 
than when the copying is extensive, or encompasses the most important parts of the 
original.”). 
 351. See id.; see also L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 
F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a small portion of the work can 
constitute “the ‘heart’ of the work,” which favors finding against fair use). 
 352. See Jon Solomon, How Long Is Too Long a College Football Game?, 
CBS SPORTS, Feb. 9, 2015, http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/how-
long-is-too-long-a-college-football-game/ [https://perma.cc/NB54-5GPP]. In 2014, 
the average college football game time was three hours and twenty-three minutes. 
Id. The time has increased over recent years due to scoring drives and increased 
commercial length. Id. On YouTube, the length of the game is two hours and forty-
five minutes without any commercials. See CFB Fans, supra note 1. 
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handful of seconds and likely does not constitute a substantial 
portion or “the heart of the work.”353 The heart of the work was the 
play that drew this reaction, when the University of Michigan punter 
bobbled the ball and Michigan State ran it in for a touchdown as time 
expired to win with its first lead of the game.354 
The fourth factor is the effect on the original work’s market.355 
This factor, along with transformativeness, has also been described 
as the most important factor of fair use because copyright is a 
commercial doctrine designed to stimulate creativity.356 This factor is 
less applicable for the case of Chris Baldwin, however, because his 
image was not already in a commercial market.357 On the other hand, 
the University of Michigan invests a substantial amount of money in 
protecting its copyrights and trademarks, and any other use of 
Baldwin’s image could have an effect on any market the university 
intended to enter.358  
The allowance of the fair use defense ensures that freedom of 
speech is not hindered by the protection of the copyrighted image.359 
Since fair use is a mixture of law and fact,360 once a court determines 
                                                 
 353. See CFB Fans, supra note 1 (showing the entirety of the game and what 
left the crowd the most shocked). 
 354. See Trahan, supra note 4 (describing the importance of the punt play at 
the end of the game). 
 355. See Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223 (explaining that the fourth fair use 
factor “focuses on whether the copy brings to the marketplace a competing 
substitute for the original”). 
 356. See id. (“Because copyright is a commercial doctrine whose objective is 
to stimulate creativity among potential authors by enabling them to earn money from 
their creations, the fourth factor is of great importance in making a fair use 
assessment.”); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 566 (1985) (describing the fourth factor as “undoubtedly the single most 
important element of fair use”). 
 357. See Man Becomes Face of Michigan’s Loss to Michigan State, 
WNEM.COM (Oct. 20, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.wnem.com/story/30309953/ 
man-becomes-face-of-michigans-loss-to-michigan-state [https://perma.cc/WJ58-
B5CZ] (noting Chris Baldwin was not a celebrity, whose face was already well 
known, but he was merely caught on camera during a football game and his image 
then became well known). 
 358. See University Seal, Trademarks and Copyright Permission, BOARD 
REGENTS, http://www.regents.umich.edu/trademarks.html [https://perma.cc/S9WS-
CB27] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“To obtain permission [for use of material 
copyrighted by the Regents of the University of Michigan] . . . find and contact 
someone who is authorized to grant permission on behalf of that unit.”). 
 359. See Bauer, supra note 31, at 852-53 (“This doctrine permits persons to 
make certain uses of a work protected by copyright without obtaining permission 
from the copyright owner.”). 
 360. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
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sufficient facts regarding each of the statutory fair use factors, the 
court may decide as a matter of law whether or not the fair use 
defense applies.361 The fair use defense is designed to allow the 
dissemination of information and copyrightable material and to 
prevent a monopoly on creative works that would chill speech and 
stunt the progress of arts and sciences.362 Therefore, the owner of the 
copyrighted image should be allowed a copyright infringement cause 
of action even if only to determine whether fair use existed to ensure 
the utmost protection to its creative property.363 
Chris Baldwin should be able to protect his image and likeness 
from being used for a profit, especially when the commercial product 
with his image does not transform his image in any significant or 
meaningful way.364 While allowing Baldwin’s right of publicity 
claim under a new federal statute, the copyright holders, University 
of Michigan and ESPN, should be allowed to bring separate claims 
for copyright infringement—ones that would not preempt Baldwin’s 
claim.365 Any alleged infringer could still use common defenses, such 
as ones arising under the First Amendment, to prove that his or her 
actions are permissible.366 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s world, where everyone is connected to technology at 
all times, it is extremely easy to become an instant Internet 
celebrity.367 It could be as simple as going to a school football 
                                                 
 361. See id. (explaining appellate review of fair use factor determinations). 
 362. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The goal of copyright is to promote the 
progress of the arts, and allowing a monopoly to occur, when most creativity is 
cumulative, would severely hinder this congressional objective. See id. 
 363. See Dewey, supra note 21 (discussing the copyright owner’s cause of 
action in regards to the Chris Baldwin case). 
 364. See id.  
 365. See id. (discussing that the broadcaster and other copyright owners 
would likely have a cause of action in Baldwin’s case). 
 366. See Bauer, supra note 31, at 852-53 (discussing doctrines that allow 
unauthorized use of creative works to be permissible). 
 367. See Terrence McCoy, How to Become Internet-Famous in Under a 
Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-
issues/how-to-become-Internet-famous-in-under-a-year/2016/01/12/09280804-b873-
11e5-b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html [https://perma.cc/A285-AVVQ] (“The first 
step to becoming Internet-famous, according to people who know about such things, 
is recognizing what makes you extraordinary. One guy earned 1.7 million Instagram 
followers on the strength of his ‘man-bun.’ Another person pulled in 4 million 
YouTube fans after perfecting the histrionics of the ‘fangirl.’ One man soared into 
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game368 or getting interviewed on the news.369 If someone has his or 
her image used without consent by another person or company for 
profit, he or she should be allowed to protect the use of that likeness 
no matter where the incident took place.370 The owner of the image 
should also be allowed to protect his or her creative property against 
unpermitted commercial use.371 Whether the commercial use by this 
third party was benign or not, no one should be allowed to profit by 
using someone’s image and someone else’s property without 
permission.372 This proposed regime of a federal right of publicity 
statute in conjunction with existing federal copyright law and a 
contractual agreement would allow those unexpectedly caught on 
camera, the Chris Baldwins of the world, to protect their image and 
likeness from being exploited.373 
                                                                                                       
stardom because he likes shooting big guns on camera and his 15 million followers 
like watching it.”). 
 368. See Man Becomes Face of Michigan’s Loss to Michigan State, supra 
note 357 (explaining Chris Baldwin’s shocked reaction became a symbol of the 
University of Michigan losing). 
 369. See Dickey, supra note 262 (explaining how Sweet Brown became an 
Internet sensation after being interviewed on a local media television channel). 
 370. See Dewey, supra note 21.  
 371. See id.  
 372. See id. (noting that with the Internet, everyone can have access to 
images whenever they want, and the people in the images and the owners of the 
images should be able to control and protect the use of that image). 
 373. See Goldschmidt, supra note 11 (discussing Baldwin not getting money 
for the use of his image at first). 
